Fear and Loathing in San Jose

by Rafael

We can't stop here. This is bat BART country.

The recent Initial Ruling On Atherton vs. CHSRA highlighted the issue of ROW acquisition, especially if that might involve exercising eminent domain. There's been a lot of speculation about the possible implications for the route out of the Bay Area and even the project as a whole. However, the plain truth is that it's now up to the judge to spell out the remedial actions CHSRA must take to bring the program level of its EIR process for the Bay Area to Central Valley section back into compliance.

One aspect that will surely have to be addressed is the issue of exactly where and how to run dedicated HSR tracks between San Jose Diridon and Gilroy, a topic I'll explore below. First though, let's recap why CHSRA preferred a route that goes through San Jose at all.

Economic Objectives

San Jose likes to bill itself as the "Capital of Silicon Valley", which actually stretches from San Jose all the way up to San Mateo and across to Cupertino. Much of the so-called "Golden Triangle" portion, bordered by US-101, I-880 and CA-237, actually lies in Santa Clara and to a lesser extent, in Milpitas. However, most of Silicon Valley is chock-full of high-tech computer hardware and software companies, ranging from highly innovative startups to global leaders in the computing and internet industries. Along with agriculture and the movie/TV industry, Silicon Valley is a primary economic engine for the state.

Both directly and indirectly, tax revenue from these companies and their workforce will contribute a large fraction of the funding for the California HSR project. Paradoxically, wealth is both why HSR has to serve Silicon Valley and why CHSRA is facing opposition to an alignment with elevated sections in the SF peninsula.

San Jose has about a million residents, making it the country's tenth-largest city. However, a significant fraction of Silicon Valley's highly skilled workforce neither lives nor works within city limits, a situation San Jose's civic leaders would like to change. The General Plan shows the location of these limits and also the city's development pattern. Most of the built-up area is "medium low density residential", though there are some higher-density developments here and there. A sizeable area just south-east of the SJC airport is blighted by aircraft noise and FAA-imposed maximum building heights. It is used by the US Army and for Guadeloupe Park.

The Diridon station lies just west of the flight path and, high-density residential housing has been/is being built just west of it. However, except for Caltrain's CEMOF maintenance facility and the HP Pavilion, long-standing efforts to attract commercial development between the station and CA-87 haven't been as successful. Back lots and at-grade parking lots are plentiful. Caltrain ridership into and out of Diridon station has historically been low for that very reason. In conjunction with the BART extension, HSR is supposed to deliver what Caltrain never could: attract commercial and residential development to the mid-town and downtown areas within approx. 1/2 mile of the station.

Note that neither HSR nor the long-sought BART extension are fully funded at this point and that there's no reason to believe airport blight will abate.

Transit Oriented Development

Nevertheless, San Jose is giving this another try and hosting a visioning workshop for the Diridon station area:

Date: Saturday, Sept. 12, 2009
Time: 9:00-12:00
Location: Parkside Hall, Room B (west of Tech Museum of Innovation), 180 Park Ave

(Note that as reported earlier, the Innovation Place HSR Workshop in Palo Alto will be held on the same day from 9:00am-3:30pm. See also Clem's post Palo Alto Innovates)

Separate plans for transit-oriented development already exist or are in development for Santa Clara, Beryessa, Fremont Warm Springs, Union City and Fremont Centerville (context: Dumbarton Rail + Amtrak CC/ACE). All of these are supposed to boost ridership into the downtown-midtown area of San Jose and, to connect to HSR at Diridon station.

HSR Phase 1: San Francisco, San Jose and Points In-Between

Whether all of these plans for rail transit and transit-oriented development will come to fruition or fail to attract sufficient funding remains to be seen. However, while the wording of AB3034 would technically permit CHSRA to exclude San Jose from phase 1 or even from later phases, any attempt to do so would face massive political opposition on account of the above. Note that the bill, which was the basis of prop 1A(2008), specifically requires the starter line of the HSR network to terminate at the San Francisco Transbay Terminal. Therefore, terminating it San Jose for now as some have proposed would require the state legislators to amend the bill with a 2/3 majority in both houses and probably, a new ballot proposition to approve that amendment. San Francisco would never allow that to happen.

Ergo, for all intents and purposes, both SF and SJ need to be served by HSR in phase 1. The most straightforward way to do that is to leverage the PCJPA's Caltrain ROW and cross over into the Central Valley via Pacheco Pass. Since Caltrain "baby bullet" service takes 57 minutes between these two cities and AB3034 explicitly mandates that express HSR trains do it in just 30, the plan of record is to quad-track the entire ROW, even though narrow ROW sections such as downtown San Mateo present major engineering challenges if eminent domain is to be avoided at all costs. A second complication is that even if FRA gives Caltrain a waiver to operate mixed traffic (new non-compliant electric EMUs + a few legacy diesels for SJ-Gilroy + UPRR freight trains) at up to 79mph, it almost certainly won't give CHSRA the same luxury in the related but separate "rule of special applicability".

So, for both regulatory and capacity reasons, the intent is to upgrade the Caltrain corridor for mostly two tracks to a full four everywhere. Building just HSR tracks in another peninsula corridor, US-101, was considered but rejected due to constructability issues (lack of available medians) and because the corridor doesn't run near the desired stations. Also, this option would have done nothing to fully grade separate and electrify Caltrain, nor could peninsula residents have transferred to long-distance HSR trains at selected stations between SF and SJ.

Approaches into San Jose Diridon

South of San Tomas Expressway in Santa Clara, CHSRA's Google map of the route (please zoom in) shows an expensive trench/tunnel section to just north of SJ Diridon. Presumably, that's just two tracks reserved for HSR, so Caltrain would remain at grade (it's already grade separated in the area). Also note that the HSR tracks need to cross over or under the UPRR tracks somewhere between Santa Clara and Gilroy. Doing so in Santa Clara isn't possible because the BART tracks will run east of UPRR's line as far south as West Santa Clara Street, immediately north of Diridon station. Present plans therefore call for HSR to stay west of the Caltrain tracks. Note that tracks will need to emerge to the surface north of W. Julian St. since that's an existing underpass and tracks need run length to fan out to the platform tracks on the new deck above the Caltrain/UPRR tracks.

CHSRA's plan of record calls for a mix of aerials, embankments and cut/fill sections to cross I-280 and reach Gilroy via the UPRR/Monterey Hwy corridor. In some sections, the UPRR ROW might have to be widened via acquisition of land or air rights from private property owners - via eminent domain if need be. Failure to qualify the risk of such takings was one of the complaints the judge upheld in Atherton vs. CHSRA.

The track fan south of Diridon station can merge west, east or directly above the UPRR tracks, as desired. However, note that W San Carlos St. is currently an overpass. It would have to be converted to an underpass to keep HSR tracks from having to change elevation yet again. However, there's probably a good reason is was built as an overpass to begin with. Also, it's not clear if all of the HSR-related grade separation works shown on CHSRA's Google map are strictly for the new HSR tracks or would also include the legacy tracks used for UPRR freight, Caltrain and Amtrak Coast Starlight. By default, the latter might be preferable, but also much more difficult to construct (shoofly tracks). Given the low total volume of FRA-compliant traffic between San Jose and Gilroy - just 6 freight, 6 Caltrains and 2 Amtrak trains - it may well be acceptable to retain grade crossings for the legacy tracks only.

Since UPRR declined to entertain an offer because of supposed safety concerns, it cannot credibly pretend they've magically gone away even CHSRA were to offer it the moon. At the very least, there would have to be some engineering studies to determine if a given implementation proposed by CHSRA meets UPRR's criteria, which it hasn't even spelled out yet. This could drag on for years even if price were no longer an issue.

Ergo, UPRR's decision not to offer up any of its ROW nor air rights above it south of Lick (Caltrain's Tamien Yard, just north of Almaden Expwy/87) means CHSRA will have to secure land/air rights nearby, if only to avoid delaying the project. This will be tricky to achieve without eminent domain, especially near the gated communities just south of Curtner Ave, which is an overpass. Note that a VTA light rail line runs in the CA-87 and CA-85 medians.

Alternative to the UPRR ROW

However, the medians of both I-280 and US-101 are still available. Freeway medians are usually narrow, possibly limiting the maximum safe speed to below what CHSRA was counting on for a given section of the route. BART trains aren't constrained, but then their top speed is 79mph to begin with. As always the devil is in the details, i.e. exactly how many feet of width are available. Google Map's satellite view doesn't provide that level of precision.

The hardest part would be the section between W Santa Clara St and just east of the gnarly I-280/CA-87 interchange. Overpasses there may not be tall enough to permit HSR trains to run underneath, so it's better to avoid it altogether. In addition, HSR trains are limited to gradients of 3.5% and need generous curve radii at elevated speeds, so an entry point west of the interchange would be ambitious.

A deceptively simple solution would be to keep the HSR tracks underground south of CEMOF all the way to east of the interchange. Once you've bitten the bullet and gone underground, there are advantages to staying there. However, it would also put the SJ station underground, with full-length (1/4mi) platforms placed at an angle relative to those of both Caltrain and BART. There would be no need for architectural Viagra on the surface, not that need ever had anything to do with it to begin with. However, in raw transportation terms, an underground station with as little as two run-through tracks and one large island or two generous side platforms would get the job done. Fortunately, the area is partly parking lots and the aforementioned visioning workshop - a very early stage of the urban planning process - hasn't even happened yet.

There's plenty of room to run west of the BART tracks curving around the HP Pavilion, but the HSR tracks actually need to run sufficiently deep to pass under the VTA light rail line that already crosses under the Caltrain/UPRR tracks. HSR would also need to cross under the Guadeloupe River, a residential district, CA-87 and a second creek before emerging in the I-280 median. Note that the HSR tracks would also need to run either west of or else under the future BART tracks.

In other words, the HSR line and platforms would have to be very deep underground anyhow. Since San Jose is a through station anyhow, perhaps a single extra-wide island or two generous side platforms would actually be sufficient. Trains run past platforms in Europe and Japan at fairly high speed all the time. Waiting passengers are simply warned to retreat to a safe distance via the PA system and markings on the floor. The VTA tracks would prevent a full concourse level, but none is needed anyhow. Multiple pedestrian connections to the surface, to BART, Caltrain and the VTA station would be sufficient. Some of these passages could feature moving walkways to reduce transfer times. ADA compatibility would be achieved via elevators, but ramps or inclined moving walkways are more reliable in case a wheelchair user needs to be evacuated.

At the anyhow pre-blighted I-280/US-101 interchange, the cheapest solution would be a tall aerial to transition between the medians. However, it would have to fly over a descending overpass lane, so it would be a tall structure. Still, the incremental visual and noise impacts should be minor. The alternative would be to execute the transition underground, but that's more expensive.

Optional Extension through Altamont Pass

Tunneling under the I-280/US-101 interchange only makes sense if there is a desire to leverage all the work that was put into reaching the I-280 median for something else: a turnoff to continue east to I-680, whose median is also still available - all the way to the foot of the Sunol grade in Fremont, actually.

If Caltrans is prepared to reserve that median for HSR trains, it could be the basis for a future shortcut to Sacramento via Altamont Pass. Between Scott Creek Rd and E Warren Ave in Fremont Warm Springs, the tracks would veer east and across to Haynes Gulch via a long tunnel under Monument Peak. There, they would veer north, running essentially at grade next to Calaveras Rd. as far as the CA-84/Calaveras Rd exit off I-680. An aerial across the CA-84 and another tunnel would lead the tracks to an intermodal with BART at El Charro Rd in east Pleasanton/west Livermore. It would be heard to avoid impacts on both the nearby ponds and Livermore Municipal Airport, since crossing at grade is not feasible because of UPRR. Altmont Pass would be traversed - except for one short section - via the I-580 median. Passing north of Tracy, tracks would connect to the phase 2 spur to Sacramento near either Manteca or Escalon.

Optional Extension to Walnut Creek

Note that the I-680 median is still available between just north of the CA-84 exits to just south of the CA-24 interchange in Walnut Creek. A tunnel section under California Blvd. would be needed to create an intermodal with the BART station. However, that road features a tight chicane and there is a medical center next to the freeway. Tunnel tracks would have to thread a needle between its buildings. This would require a technical feasibility study as well as the consent of Kaiser Permanente regarding any number of issues, including construction nuisance and vibrations from passing trains. Eminent domain against a hospital is basically unheard of, so I'd consider the whole thing a long shot. However, even without an intermodal with BART, there would at least be HSR service to eastern Alameda and central Contra Costa county.

Maps for Alternative #1

The alternative ROW and extension options are shown on the map below. Switch to satellite mode to see why the HSR station would have to be deep underground. Zoom out in map mode to see the regional implications. Switch to terrain mode to see where there are mountains to contend with.

The picture below the map shows location of major known faults - basically, Calaveras Rd. and I-680 north of Sunol are right on top of the Calaveras fault. The Hayward fault generated the 1868 earthquake, estimated at 6.8 on the Richter scale. Paleoseismologists have estimated the mean time between such events on that particular fault to be 140 years, so statistically, it's due right around now. Perhaps it's not the most auspicious time to build a railroad, but the people of California have never allowed themselves to be paralyzed by a fear of Mother Nature. See our earlier post Shake, Rattle And Roll for more background on earthquake engineering in the railway industry.


View San Jose Diridon: HSR Underground in a larger map

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Alternative #2

Since we're talking hypotheticals anyhow, here is a second alternative based on using 101 between SJ and Gilroy.

To come up with this one, I started in Gilroy and worked my way north. It quickly became apparent that the problem in San Jose could be addressed by simply moving the HSR station to the huge transit-oriented development at Beryessa and continuing north up the East Bay instead of the SF peninsula. CHSRA did study the scenario of SF + Oakland + SJ via Pacheco but not along this particular right of way, which does not depend on UPRR but precludes extending BART south. Moreover, whatever is gained in San Jose is lost (and then some) because the only available unused railroad right of way runs from Union City to just north of Oakland Coliseum. Reaching it from Fremont Irvington with full grade separation requires tunnels in Niles, tiptoeing around the water supply for 100,000 people.

The aforementioned available ROW runs right next to BART, but unfortunately its tracks cross over in three locations. That would greatly complicate the vertical alignment, though at least heavy freight does not impose any gradient constraints.

North of Oakland Coliseum, a few miles of greenfield ROW immediately next to BART would be required, complicated by the Fruitvale station and transit village. A tunnel under the Lake Merritt outflow and 4th Street in Oakland would need to pass under the east portals of the Webster/Posey road tunnels across to Alameda. The upside is an elevated intermodal station with West Oakland BART. Sanity would dictate that HSR terminate here in phase 1, after all downtown SF is just one BART stop away. However, as discussed above, AB3034 mandates a terminus in San Francisco Transbay Terminal. Since the station there is in the basement and the new east span of the Bay Bridge was redesigned specifically not to support the weight of BART/light rail/HSR trains, a second transbay tube would have to be part of the phase 1 specifications. Note that it could not cross the existing tube underwater.

As a result of all this, switching to the East Bay would be no easier than sticking with the peninsula. Multiple hard-fought political decisions would have to be reversed, multiple EIS/EIR processes re-done. Whatever ARRA is available for California HSR would be spent elsewhere in the state.

Summary:

- HSR up 101 from Gilroy ($)
- modest elevated San Jose HSR station at Beryessa TOD ($)
- VTA's WPML ROW used for HSR (priceless ;^)
- tunnel in Niles to reach UC BART (stacked single tracks, $$)
- dedicated HSR alignment next to BART ($$$, ROW incomplete, BART crosses three times)
- tunnel under Oakland's Chinatown ($$$)
- second transbay tube to San Francisco Transbay Terminal Center ($$$$)

Consolation prizes:

- BART extended to Livermore via I-580 ($$)
- Caltrain electrification SF-SJ Diridon ($$)
- VTA light rail subway under E Santa Clara St and up to Beryessa via track stacking on short section of WPML ($$$)

Canceled: BART to Santa Clara (-$$$$)
Canceled: BART maintenance facility in Santa Clara (-$$)
Canceled: widening Caltrain corridor (-$, -litigation-related delays)
Canceled: Dumbarton rail (ROW in Union City usurped by HSR) (-$$)

Shelved indefinitely: DTX tunnel in San Francisco (-$$$)
Pushed back to PCJPA: full grade separation of Caltrain corridor (-$$$)


View HSR up WPML instead of BART in a larger map

Basically, this Alternative #2 was an interesting exercise, but it would really put a pride of lions among the pigeons. The takeaway is that switching to the East Bay would solve some political issues in the mid-peninsula at the expense of a whole new set of headaches.

Alternative #1 is more limited in scope, it "just" completely reconfigures the SJ station and moves the one in Gilroy to the 101 median.

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UPDATE: Alternative #3: Commenter BruceMcF (h/t) has suggested that stacking HSR and VTA light rail tracks in the 87/85 medians between Lick and the Santa Teresa district would be both feasible and cheaper than the alternatives discussed above.

There are multiple existing road overpasses, including Almaden Expressway and Blossom Hill Rd. next to the station there. The stacked tracks would have to fly over those, raising tracks very high. VTA light rail leaves the 87 median and forks tracks at Ohlone Chynoweth station next to the 85/87 interchange. It leaves the 85 median in the Santa Teresa district. Combined with station access issues, this favors stacking the HSR tracks on top of light rail.

However, that puts the (slightly) heavier HSR trains on top and increases noise emissions. HSR's maximum gradient is smaller than the one light rail vehicles can negotiate and, greater vertical transition radii are needed on account of the higher speed. Note that VTA light rail is triple-tracked in some sections and would be down to just two after the project. Separately, note that the 101 median is not available right at the 85/101 interchange but that land for tracks to hug the northbound on-ramp is. At an appropriate point further south, the alignment would cut back over into the median.

Note that VTA's daytime light rail operations would need to continue during the construction period.


View SJ Diridon to Gilroy via UPRR/87/85/101 in a larger map

CHSRA and UPRR Are Talking

Whether it's a prelude to a grand bargain or not isn't clear, but Gary Richards is reporting in the Mercury News today that UPRR and the CHSRA have begun discussions about resolving the dispute over the ROW between San José and Gilroy:

Officials with the railroad and the California High Speed Rail Authority confirmed that they have held discussions in hopes of resolving their differences, which if not settled soon could cost the rail authority $3 billion in federal stimulus aid and state bond money, delay construction in Northern California and leave in doubt the electrification of Caltrain....

"Our position continues to be the same as what we've said in the past," Union Pacific spokesman Tom Lange said from Omaha, Neb. "The high speeds of these trains is simply not compatible in our right of way.

"We've had discussions with them, but the bottom line is that safety comes first and foremost."

There's been a lot of discussion in the comments about whether running HSR trains on tracks near the UPRR tracks, but not in their ROW, would pose a safety hazard of any sort. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't, but UPRR's position is clear, and with the recent ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA it's clear that the issue has to be revisited. So it is good to hear that UPRR and CHSRA are talking, but it is quite unclear what are the substance of the talks and whether or not there's any hope of forward momentum.

One problem is that the judge that issued the ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA, Michael Kenney, did not actually indicate what remedies the CHSRA must undertake to address the three specific problems with the EIR the judge found. Despite claims from Peninsula NIMBYs and HSR deniers like Richard Tolmach, the judge has not ruled that the entire EIR must be redone or that the judge found the choice of Pacheco Pass to connect the Bay Area to the Central Valley was flawed. And as Richards' article makes clear, time is of the essence:

Timing is critical — and that has some officials saying the railroad's stance is a negotiating ploy, partly because the line is lightly used. Currently, just 14 trains run each day between Gilroy and San Jose — six freight, six commuter and two Amtrak trains.

On Oct. 2, the rail authority plans to submit its application for federal stimulus money. It needs approval of those funds soon to meet Washington's requirement that construction be under way by 2012.

If the judge rules that the entire environmental study be revisited, "that could be the death knell for construction on the Peninsula," said high-speed board member Rod Diridon. "If it's a remedial action, we can deal with that."

The recent ruling may also delay Caltrain's long-range plans to expand commuter service by converting its diesel trains to electric. This would enable the agency to speed up service and run more trains more quickly. It is relying heavily on stimulus cash to bankroll the $785 million initiative, $516 million of which is still unfunded.

Some will surely quibble, as they have in recent comments, that this shows the flaws of Diridon's insistence on including the Peninsula corridor in the CHSRA application for federal HSR stimulus funds. Personally I think the CHSRA was right to be aggressive in pursuing these funds. But this does make clear that more than the old Altamont vs. Pacheco dispute is at stake here. Federal stimulus funds are necessary to get construction underway on the Peninsula - construction that, as Mike Scanlon pointed out Wednesday night, is vital to Caltrain's survival.

As I have repeatedly predicted, the parties to this lawsuit have decided it is acceptable to risk the future of passenger rail in the Bay Area - including the HSR project and the very existence of Caltrain - to pick a fight over what is a comparatively small matter. True supporters of HSR would have accepted the Pacheco choice, worked to ensure it was built properly and with respect to the environment, rather than use that choice to try and blow up the whole project.

Still, it is good to see that CHSRA and UPRR are trying to be sensible about this and are talking to each other about the matter. These discussions can take quite a long time - UPRR has been dragging its feet on selling the Davenport-Pajaro line to Santa Cruz County for over 5 years now.

Tough negotiations with freight companies are nothing new. Twenty years ago, it took more than two years of talks before Caltrain agreed to buy the San Jose-to-San Francisco tracks from Southern Pacific for $242.3 million. Talks between the Valley Transportation Authority and Union Pacific dragged on for four years before the VTA agreed in 2002 to pay $80 million to run the BART-to-San Jose extension down the UP corridor between Fremont and San Jose.

"We've negotiated with them on several acquisitions, and they are very difficult negotiators," VTA General Manager Michael Burns said. "They are a private company out to protect their interests.

"But I will be very surprised if at the end they don't reach an agreement."

This is why I believe a federal role is absolutely necessary to ensure these negotiations conclude quickly and fairly to all sides. Current federal law gives UPRR all the negotiating power, enabling a freight railroad whose operations often seem stuck in the middle of the 20th century to hold up the development of a modern 21st century passenger railroad network.

President Barack Obama has made high speed rail a key part of his administration's vision for America's future. But so far he seems to have emphasized HSR funding over the other key policy aspects of implementing HSR. Now I'm not going to complain that Obama wants to change 60 years of federal transportation policy and finally direct some real funds to HSR. And yet that's not going to be enough to ensure HSR happens.

While I recognize that it is not Obama's style to force or pressure anyone into doing anything, both the White House and the Congress - particularly California's two powerful US Senators - need to be examining ways to modernize US railroad policy and legislation. In particular they need to redress the balance of power between the freight railroads, which are essentially private contractors for the federal government and who owe their very existence to the federal government, and the state and local passenger rail systems that the federal government wishes to promote and expand.

The best way to accomplish this would be to have Senator Feinstein or Senator Boxer help mediate these conversations, potentially alongside the Secretary of Transportation or even Vice-President "Amtrak Joe" Biden. They can encourage UPRR and CHSRA to quickly come to an agreement that satisfies both sides, while letting UPRR know that if they do not come to a quick agreement, then perhaps it would be time to change federal law to help provide entities like CHSRA a more level playing field - starting with eliminating the obsolete ban on states using eminent domain on federally-chartered railroads.

That would require a greater level of leadership from California's federal representatives than we have yet seen on HSR. But it is now time for them to step up and prevent a signature project from falling into a morass.

A Grand Bargain With UPRR?

by Rafael

the recent Initial Ruling on Atherton v. CHSRA underscored yet again that lines on a map are not at all the same thing as deeds to rights of way. The judge essentially signaled that the level of risk of eminent domain takings needs to be quantified at the program level, i.e. factor into the choice of preferred route. In this particular case, the biggest red flag related to the UPRR Coast Corridor ROW between Santa Clara and Gilroy, especially the section south of way point "Lick". It lies roughly 3 miles south of San Jose Diridon, close to the intersection of Almaden Expressway and hwy 87.

However, that isn't the only stretch of the planned network in which CHSRA will have to contend with UPRR - far from it, in fact. As we discussed on this blog back in March, 50% of the entire HSR network as planned today relies on acquiring part of a UPRR right of way or else land very close to it. Where possible, the expensive grade separations required for HSR should include adjacent legacy tracks to maximize bang per taxpayer buck.


View UPRR sections of CA HSR route in a larger map

In the discussion thread on the Initial Ruling On Atherton v. CHSRA, regular commenter Tony D. in San Jose(?) Gilroy claimed that "Freight service in this corridor and traffic on Monterey Hwy is nil." While that's no doubt an overstatement, it does highlight the fact that the coast corridor isn't actually all that busy north of San Luis Obispo. Its primary value is as as a backup freight route in case UPRR's core route via Cajon Pass and the Tehachapis were to become unavailable for trains heading up the west coast or across to Salt Lake City, e.g. after an earthquake. Since UPRR is a for-profit enterprise, Tony surmised "that [it] will either operate or co-operate [with] high-speed rail in California. They're not blind to the profits HSR systems are making overseas [...]. I don't think this would be a bad arrangement."

To which another regular, SF native and Amtrak employee Jim, replied: "Well they can't just operate it, they have to bid on it first and prove that they can provide the service infrastructure (staff, ticketing systems, the list goes on per the requirements an operator must offer) and UP doesn't have any such thing or people to do the job. [CHSRA] wants someone who can bring experience, personnel and the other infrastructure needed for passenger travel. That means Amtrak, an airline or a foreign railway."

Now, I don't work for UPRR nor do I have any shares in the company or any other affiliation to it. I have no inside knowledge regarding where the company's head is really at relative to California HSR right now. Publicly, the company still maintains that HSR trains running next to its own would be a safety hazard. Simple passing of an aerodynamically contoured high speed train has already been shown not to present a showstopper problem even for extra-tall AAR plate H cars loaded with two empty containers. Lateral sway at the top of the upper container reached a maximum at a relative speed of 110mph and declined beyond that. The amount of sway obviously depends on the track centerline distance as well, which in the California system could be larger than the usual 15' or so (if the ROW is wide enough).

The root cause of the cited safety concerns may therefore be the quality of UPRR's track and rolling stock maintenance program. The income generated by hosting HSR would go a long way toward addressing any deficiencies on that score. Derailment detection and automatic train protection systems would further reduce the risk of a freight train ever fouling an adjacent track and also triggering a follow-on collision.

So, the noises UPRR is making could be either a signal that UPRR isn't really interested in avoiding derailments or, a negotiating ploy to jack up the price.

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However, for the sake of argument, let's pretend that Tony is correct and that UPRR secretly would be interested in getting back into the intercity passenger rail business, if only it were sufficiently profitable.

The experience in other countries has shown that true bullet trains can and do turn operating profits, i.e. enough to pay for running the trains, maintaining the system, insurance fees and future expansion beyond the starter line. What they cannot do is turn a total profit, i.e. service the debt on the initial capital investment as well. That difference, combined with property tax laws, is why US railroads are not voluntarily building HSR systems on their own nickel. DesertXPress is the exception that proves the rule: it would be a loss leader for getting punters/tourists/convention attendees from (Southern) California to Lost Wages and back again.

HSR opponents often cite this inability of passenger rail to fully fund its own infrastructure as evidence that it is a bad idea per se. As this blog has often pointed out, they conveniently forget the financial, energy security, environmental and social costs shouldered by taxpayers when they agree to invest in new highway lane-miles and airport runways. Fortunately, California voters showed in November 2008 they understand that moving people - as opposed to freight - just isn't a profitable enterprise in its own right. It takes public investment to reap the macroeconomic benefits of high speed rail, which in the California system will include traveling on renewable electricity instead of distilled dino-juice.

Funding is supposed to come from federal, state and local governments plus private investors. The ~$33 billion estimate for the starter line reflects the cost of planning, land purchases, engineering, constructing the line plus yards and maintenance facilities, buying a fleet of trains and developing the human resources needed for safe and cost-effective operations. In its 2008 Business Plan (PDF p23), CHSRA estimated the cost of acquiring the ROW for the starter line at 7% of the the total, i.e. roughly $2.3 billion. This assumed that required land already in public hands (Caltrain, SCRRA, Caltrans etc.) would be made available at no cost.

However, since UPRR is an interstate freight railroad that ostensibly delivers a public service so valuable Congress even delegated limited powers of eminent domain to it, the chances of successfully exercising eminent domain against UPRR itself are slim to none. That means the company has CHSRA over a barrel and can more or less name its price. The initial ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA has now strengthened its hand even further.

The operations of the California HSR are supposed to be put out to tender via long-term contracts, separately for the infrastructure (a local monopoly) and the trains (competition possible). The idea was that these tenders will be entirely divorced from the process of acquiring land and getting the infrastructure built. However, there's more than one way to skin a cat. As we explored in the post on HiSpeed Services And Branding, there is always the option of bartering for ROW rather than paying for it up front.

Any railroad that owns a ROW that CHSRA would like a slice of could negotiate for the initial contract to operate the HSR infrastructure and/or for easements such as deeply discounted slots on the timetable or blocks of seats on trains to be operated by someone else. One-off asset sales generate cash, but railroad operators are in the business of running trains. Participating in the operations of the HSR system could therefore be an attractive proposition for them.

If CHSRA could somehow strike a statewide "Grand Bargain" barter deal with UPRR, that would solve most of its ROW issues at a stroke. It would also allow the Authority to claim UPRR as a private investor-in-kind. After all, a dollar you don't need to spend is almost as good as one you raise from financial institutions. Some lateral thinking could go a long way here.

Whether this would be a genuine bargain for taxpayers or a Faustian one obviously depends on the fine print, of which there would no doubt be copious amounts. Giving up on the opportunity to put the initial operations contracts out to open tender, reducing its scope and/or saddling it with easements would be no small matter. Negotiators would also need to put a dollar figure on the value of grade separations plus fences plus CCTV surveillance of the entire ROW width, including all legacy freight/passenger tracks, to a freight operator. Cameras and software could conceivably even detect a derailed bogie on a freight car before that train's crew does. The wireless signaling and train control infrastructure of the HSR network could be leveraged to implement interoperable PTC functionality on the heavy freight tracks at sharply lower incremental cost. If all traffic on the entire ROW is controlled by a single infrastructure operator, the accident liability issue should become much more tractable.

Add to that the potential for light rail freight, i.e. driverless High Speed Cargo trainsets coupled to passenger trains during the day plus a limited number of much slower cargosprinter or intermodal trains at night. Such trains would need to negotiate the 3.5% gradients in mountain crossings. To avoid excessive track maintenance overheads, the axle load on HSR tracks is strictly limited, typically to 17 metric tonnes, including the power cars/locomotives. That's only possible with non-compliant equipment, so light freight trains would be restricted to the isolated HSR network augmented with spurs to transshipment facilities in selected locations. The business model would be focused on getting high value goods shipped quickly and trucks off the roads. In technical, regulatory and business model respects, light freight would be entirely divorced from conventional heavy freight rail.

In the simplest scenario, UPRR could limit its involvement with HSR to operating and maintaining the infrastructure according to timetables negotiated with the train operator(s).

However, the company could go one step further and negotiate to also operate some or even all of the trains wholesale, by which I mean it would employ the drivers and maintain the rolling stock. Dealing with HSR and light freight equipment would involve a learning curve, but there would be plenty of time to build up a new business unit with a skilled workforce, headed up by managers poached from foreign railways that already have plenty of HSR experience. Keep in mind that UPRR has been in business for 147 years and that during most of that time, its progenitors did operate passenger trains. Companies can and do change their business models all the time, just look at how Apple Computer now makes cell phones and sells music online.

The retail end of high speed passenger trains, i.e. marketing, selling tickets, cabin service and cleaning, could be left to organizations that already have relevant expertise in the state: heavy rail transit operators (Amtrak California, Caltrain, Metrolink et al.), perhaps airlines already plying the California Corridor. Some of these might prefer to own their trainsets, others could charter them from UPRR in whatever livery they want. Similarly, UPRR might be content with just running the trains for established logistics players like FedEx, UPS etc. and not handle individual cargo items. On the other hand, retailing intermodal freight and cargosprinter service might well be something UPRR would want to do itself.

Final notes:

1) Needless to say, the bigger the bite of the HSR cherry UPRR would get without having to bid for it in open tender, the more value that would represent. At some point, it would exceed the total represented by the ROW offered. Conceivably, UPRR might even have to throw in track construction services, even cash, to get the deal it wants. That's fine, every dollar of private investment, in kind or regular, would let CHSRA stretch taxpayer dollars (both state and federal) that much further.

2) As part of any Grand Bargain, UPRR would formally transfer the ROW (land or underground/air rights) for the HSR tracks to a new entity owned by the state of California, possibly others as well. UPRR would not have a stake in this entity. This arrangement would let it avoid a massive hike on its property taxes while ensuring the new entity will be able to put the follow-on operations contracts out to a genuinely open tender some (large) number of years later.

3) Since infrastructure operations and maintenance and possibly train maintenance will be natural monopolies, the rates UPRR would be permitted to charge for these services would have to be spelled out in the Grand Bargain contract and regulated thereafter to prevent gouging. A cap on fee income would give UPRR an incentive to participate in track construction to make sure it's done right. The company does not yet have the specialized expertise required to actually design and build the track and overhead catenary geometry for a safe HSR system, that's where experienced foreign engineering consultants come in. UPRR would contribute its expertise in general track construction plus material logistics and some brawn plus supervisors on site. The idea is to let them learn on the job so they can maintain the high-tech infrastructure after it's built.

4) BNSF might be interested in a similar Grand Bargain in the Central Valley, perhaps even on its Trancon line out of the LA basin. HSR infrastructure operations are a natural local monopoly, with appropriate care it's perfectly possible to hand over control to another operator at well-defined interface locations. Air traffic controllers do it all time.

5) All of the above fun and game are moot if neither UPRR nor BNSF are interested in participating in HSR operations in any way. That is their prerogative, of course.

Two Quick Peninsula Updates

1. Caltrain board approves MOU with CHSRA:

One last-minute change to the deal was the elimination of a controversial passage that indicated the bullet train would operate on a four-track alignment, assuming there typically would be two tracks for Caltrain and a pair for high-speed rail.

This was only "controversial" because Palo Alto insists on having veto power over the operations and basic needs of the system, which they have no right to claim. As others have pointed out in the comments, a four-track solution is still expected to be adopted. Personally I think Caltrain and the CHSRA should have kept that language, since NIMBYs cannot be appeased, as they immediately proved:

Palo Alto Council Member Pat Burt, echoing the concerns of other officials and residents, said the cities should have the right to partner with the state as well, not just Caltrain.

"The cities must be allowed to enter into this process in a substantive way," Burt said. "(The Caltrain board) is not designed as its first priority to preserve and protect the quality of life of the cities that the railway passes through."

Right. Their priority is to operate efficient passenger rail service. Burt's words are significant though for explaining what this is all about for him - preserving a 20th century model of urban life that is obsolete and not at all workable in the 21st century. He thinks Palo Alto can live in a kind of permanent 1995. Is this the kind of forward and progressive thinking Palo Alto wants to be known for?

Still, this is a welcome development that shows the high speed rail project is making important progress.

2. Court throws out Menlo Park's letter to CHSRA:

In August 2008, Menlo Park and Atherton joined a lawsuit against the rail authority. One of Menlo Park's arguments in joining the suit was that rail officials had not responded to their letter. Under law, the agency is required to respond to every letter it receives.

But in the March 27 ruling, Judge Michael Kenny said the city did not adequately prove that it had in fact sent the letter, and that it didn't do enough to make sure it had been received. Furthermore, after the release of the final environmental document but before it was certified, there was a 40-day window in which Menlo Park could have resent its letter, the judge said. The city apparently did not do so.

During the City Council's March 31 meeting, City Manager Glen Rojas said the plaintiffs' attorney did not think the exclusion of the city's letter would have much effect on the case, because similar arguments had been made by others, including the town of Atherton.

The article also has an interesting discussion of whether Menlo Park will reconsider its decision to sue. You'd think that in a time of financial crisis for virtually every city in the state, Menlo Park residents would prefer that their taxes pay for libraries and pothole repairs, not frivolous lawsuits against the CHSRA.

LA - San Diego: Quo Vadis?

Note: commenter calwatch, a member of the Technical Working Group for the LA - San Diego segment of HSR, kindly contributed to the research for this post.

We recently discussed plans to completely remodel the overburdened Lindbergh Field airport and before that, the possibility of extending HSR to Mexico, because the SD Trolley Blue Line to the border is so busy.

Of course, both of these presumed that the planned HSR spur from LA Union Station to San Diego Santa Fe depot - or perhaps, a new multimodal transit hub at Lindbergh Field - will actually be built as intended. This requires that the starter line attract enough ridership to generate an operating profit that will permit the sale of non-state bonds to raise capital for phase II, which also includes extensions to Irvine and Sacramento. It also requires that CHSRA secure a suitable right of way, which will not be easy and needs to be done now, more than a decade before phase II construction will even begin.

Here is a map showing the principal railroad rights of way in Southern California (and their owners) plus several of the currently unused freeway medians. Despite appearances to the contrary, it does not represent a smorgasbord of options for HSR - the majority of them are already reserved for freight (expansion) and local/regional transit. At least the risky maglev project through the Inland Empire appears to have shrunk to just a gleam in a number of politicians' eyes: Sen. Harry Reid, Gov. Schwarzenegger and Gov. Gibbons. Rapid transit service between Anaheim ARTIC and Ontario airport via hwy 57 might be more easily implemented via a sexy bus styled by an F1 aerodynamicist and running at elevated speeds (90-150mph) on dedicated lanes and possibly even batteries. HSR is great, but it's not always the most appropriate option.


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Passenger rail service between LA and San Diego is currently provided by the popular Amtrak Pacific Surfliner that runs through Orange County and down the San Diego county coast. The trip takes about 2 hours.

HSR would cut that to 1h 15m, even though CHSRA has selected a preferred route via Riverside county that adds around 30 miles. There were three reasons for this preference:

1. LAWA desperately wants to relieve California's largest airport LAX, where a project to add a third runway had to be canceled after protests from nearby communities. That is the primary reason why the HSR network includes both Palmdale and Ontario airports.
   
2. San Bernardino, Riverside and other inland towns are currently only connected to LA via Metrolink, if at all. However, none of lines has a stop next to the airport terminals, the nearest large airport in the region.
   
3. An HSR alignment along the coast ROW was ruled out because that is too narrow to support four tracks south of Fullerton in Orange County, because of the visual clutter an overhead catenary system would bring to San Clemente and Del Mar in particular and, because of concerns about weather-related and geological hazards that NCTD has had to deal with in the past. CHSRA recommended an upgrade to 110mph diesel-based service be considered but did not pursue the corridor any further.
   

The preference for a detour past Ontario airport and Riverside introduces several critical ROW issues:

• CHSRA is proposing expensive run-through tracks (zoom in on LA please) for a new upper deck at LA Union Station. We have already discussed several alternatives that would require fewer eminent domain takings on this blog. For a variety of reasons, most commenters insisted that HSR trains should stop at Union Station, not at any separate station connected by a local shuttle service - especially one anywhere near the new State Historical Park. Any run-through tracks for HSR would be separate from the ones already planned for FRA-compliant Amtrak/Metrolink equipment on the lower deck. The objective is to secure alignments that allow trains to run from SF/Sacramento to both Anaheim and San Diego without having to waste time reversing direction in LA. Note that there are no plans for direct HSR service between Anaheim and San Diego because Amtrak Pacific Surfliner already serves that market.
  
  
• Securing a ROW from LA Union Station to Riverside
  
  
• Securing a ROW from Riverside to San Diego
  
  
• Avoiding ROW conflicts with freight capacity expansion in Southern California. Fortunately, analysis to date suggests that a combination of expanding conventional rail freight and adding dedicated truck lanes on selected freeways would be a lot more more effective than an inland port served by a bleeding-edge electricity-guzzling freight maglev system in dealing with congestion and even air quality problems that are constraining growth in shipping volume.
  

This last point is really important, because 1 in 7 jobs in LA county depends on the ports. The majority of all manufactured goods imported from Asia into the US flows through the container terminals there and to point east via the Inland Empire. Already, rail freight up to Redondo Junction near downtown Los Angeles has been consolidated via the fully grade separated Alameda Corridor, freeing up old rights of way for projects such as the Harbor Subdivision Transit Corridor.

The success of freight consolidation has spawned a sequel dubbed Alameda Corridor East, with phase I already in progress. Its scope are improvements to 39 grade crossings the UPRR rights of way in the San Gabriel Valley between Redondo Junction and Pomona. The grade separation projects already completed did not anticipate the construction of HSR tracks, something CHSRA's consultant engineers HNTB (also selected for the SF peninsula) are aware of. Later phases will address the eastern section of the UPRR corridors out to Colton and beyond as well as the "91" corridor owned by BNSF, which CHSRA has identified as the preferred corridor between Redondo Junction to Fullerton. South to Anaheim and Irvine, the ROW is narrow and owned by Metrolink.

San Gabriel Valley
At this point, it looks increasingly unlikely that CHSRA can obtain land on the preferred UPRR Colton/Riverside and Colton ROWs for the purpose of constructing HSR tracks. The ROW choice is very much in flux, but right now leading candidates for alternatives out to Riverside appear to be, in no particular order:

• I-10 median on an elevated alignment. The section between LA Union Station and El Monte is already occupied by a single track used by the Metrolink San Bernardino line. The most likely route would therefore involve air rights over UPRR's Colton/Riverside ROW between Redondo Junction and the I-605/hwy 60 interchange, then cutting up to I-10 alongside I-605. The all-essential connecting transit to cover the ~1/2 mile to the three Ontario airport terminals would likely be implemented either via shuttle buses or an elevated people mover.
  
  One big problem is that there is no easy way to cut across from Colton to the I-215 median, the preferred route down to San Diego. Colton, San Bernardino and Riverside all very much want a station in the area, but residents near March AFB in Moreno Valley are objecting. Note that Metrolink has plans for a new service out to Perris, Hemet and San Jacinto.
  
  An alternative would be to cut across to the I-15 median just east of Ontario instead, perhaps even via the long-term parking lot at Ontario, S Haven Ave and a short section of UPRR's Colton/Riverside ROW (e.g. via air rights). The alignment would then continue south to Murrieta via Corona and Lake Elsinore. An intermodal station with Metrolink might be possible if the existing one for Corona were moved about a mile east.
  
  
• Hwy 60 median east of the 710 interchange. It is still unused all the way out to Riverside UC and connected to the preferred route down to San Diego via the I-215 median. Reaching it from Redondo Junction would be difficult if UPRR refuses to cede at least air rights on its Colton/Riverside ROW . Moreover, there are two competing applications for the hwy 60 median: the Eastside Light Rail project and, dedicated truck lanes to haul freight out of the LA/LB ports (though other freeways are also under consideration).
  
  For HSR, a bigger issue with this option is that hwy 60 runs a couple of miles south of Ontario airport. However, a sufficiently fast high-capacity shuttle bus service or people mover up S New Haven could link the HSR station, the East Ontario Metrolink station, the long-term parking lots and all three terminals. A suboptimal solution, but better than nothing.
  
  Both the I-15 and the I-215 medians are more easily reached via hwy 60 than via I-10.
  

Note that both solutions involve obtaining some co-operation, e.g. air rights, from UPRR to proceed south-east from Redondo Junction. The same safety/liability issues that railroad raised in the context of a serious derailment with debris fouling an adjacent HSR track also applies to air rights. What if a derailment were to damage a support column or portal? How would the accident be communicated fast enough to avoid a potentially catastrophic follow-on accident involving a high speed train with hundreds of people on board?

Earthquake safety may be more manageable, though land would be needed to install the support structures. That could prevent UPRR from laying down another track and/or jeopardize the safety of its employees hanging off railroad cars. UPRR may be a crufty old-fashioned railroad compared to BNSF, but they are profitable and they have been in operation for 146 years. They've almost certainly forgotten more about day-to-day railroad operations and off-design conditions than CHSRA's board members will ever know.

HSR isn't being built in a vacuum, it is being introduced into the pre-existing US railroad ecosystem (for lack of a better term). If it has not yet done so, CHSRA would be wise to retain the services of a recently retired senior railroad operations manager, because neither civil engineers like Mehdi Morshed nor foreign HSR vendors nor foreign HSR operators will be able to bring local knowledge of (antiquated) operating practices to bear in CHSRA's negotiations with the freight rail companies and FRA. You can't reach consensus until the other side is persuaded that you fully understand the concerns they are raising. Operations guys tend to trust their own, because nothing focuses the mind on safety like an injury or death on your watch.

I-15 Managed Lanes
Unfortunately, getting past Ontario is only half the battle. SANDAG is already constructing additional managed lanes in the I-15 median that CHSRA was counting on in the 20-mile stretch between Escondido and south of Miramar. This video animation shows how this "freeway within a freeway" will be accessed via high overpasses. To date, no provision has been made to accommodate HSR. One option now under consideration would use even taller overpasses to permit tracks running on an aerial alignment.

A third option would rely on a covered trench below the center lanes, supported by columns in the middle. If this visually and mechanically more appealing variation is chosen, it would be prudent to anticipate those future trenches now rather than destroy nearly 40 lane-miles of perfectly good freeway lanes later on. One option would be to deploy prefabricated concrete slabs that could be removed during and re-installed after HSR construction. Another option would be to bite the bullet now and construct those trenches sans tracks in anticipation of HSR construction a decade hence. Worst case, HSR does not happen and they would be re-purposed for some other transportation application (zero emissions lanes? water pipes?) The question is: who would pay for digging trenches now rather than later? Note that the spaces between the on- and off-ramps would serve as emergency access points every few miles, eliminating the need for a service tunnel. The Escondido station should probably be sited north of where the managed lanes begin.

Note also that might be possible to obtain land just west of I-15 to avoid having to deal with the managed lanes complication, but 20 miles is a long stretch.

Miramar, Lindbergh Field and beyond
Further south, yet more pitfalls await our intrepid HSR planners. There is as yet no easy solution for cutting over from the I-15 median to the existing railroad coast ROW owned by the San Diego Northern Railway. The closest approach is at Miramar, a Marine Air Corps Station. County voters rejected a proposal to ask the Marines to leave so the field could be converted to a new airport far from downtown.

That ROW is wide enough for four tracks near Lindbergh Field, of which two are already in use for FRA-compliant equipment operated by Amtrak, NCTD and BNSF. The other two are used by SD Trolley, i.e. light rail. Unless FRA grants a rapid rail waiver along the same lines as the one that will be needed in Orange County, the HSR tracks will most likely have to run on an aerial, see slide 22 of this presentation. It seems highly unlikely that this would introduce any clearance problems for aircraft if wind conditions force them to take off to the east or, that wake turbulence and jet exhausts would even be noticeable to HSR trains. However, the authors appear to have include HSR at the last minute as an afterthought: there is no 400m (1/4 mile) island platform for the HSR trains nor any pedestrian overpass to reach them - three would be needed. Fixing this at a later date would require a massive change to the transit terminal's signature wave roof, so it should be elevated some 25-30' before the architectural plans are finalized.

Otherwise, CHSRA will have to stick with plan A and somehow site its station at the beautiful historic Santa Fe Depot near downtown or else further south, e.g. near Petco Park.


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Finally, HSR will need a yard for overnight train storage, perhaps even maintenance. If BNSF are amenable to the idea, one possible location would be all the way down in near the salt ponds near Main St/I-5 in Castle Park. That location would double as an HSR station for communities near the border.


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Grade Separations Done Right

One of the core claims of the HSR deniers that are trying to kill the system on the Peninsula is that an above-grade set of rails will look like a freeway - like some sort of "Berlin Wall". Here's what one group of deniers claims will result in Menlo Park from above-grade HSR:



The only thing missing from this image is barbed wire, gun towers, and a GDR flag.

But how are grade separations for HSR trains in urban areas accomplished in Europe? A quick glance shows that the "omg Berlin Wall!" claims are nonsense and that elegant above-grade solutions that enhance the character of cities are possible.

Here's a train from Monterosso, Italy:



Notice the elegant use of archways to break up the elevated structure and to integrate with the surrounding landscape. This also offers many more opportunities to cross the ROW than even exist with the current at-grade Caltrain tracks.

Here's an image from Berlin. Notice the shops that have been integrated into the elevated structure:



And another image of ICE trains in Berlin:



To Britain now, with a Eurostar train at Lambeth Road in London:



This is obviously a much older elevated structure but it too uses the multiple archway concept to both provide separate tracks but also opens up the structure to light, pedestrians, and other methods of keeping a community together.

Too bad there's no examples on the Peninsula of how arches help make structures look better and more open. Oh, wait, what's this?



(Stanford University, for those of you who aren't aware.)

It is my sincere hope that the cities along the Caltrain/HSR route will consider suggesting these kinds of solutions to grade separating the tracks in their communities, and refuse to follow a small but loud group of anti-HSR forces in opposing one of the most important projects California has considered in decades.

Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Atherton and other cities should use European HSR systems as models for how to successfully implement improved passenger rail in their cities. It's not a choice between a "Berlin Wall" or a tunnel or nothing.

America Speaks, Obama Acts

Note: Rafael wrote much of this post, and I've made some edits and additions. -Robert

There's an interesting article in the Politico today on President Barack Obama's central role in getting the $8 billion in HSR funds into the stimulus.

The article portrays the $8 billion for HSR in the stimulus bill as part of some dastardly backroom plot to force high speed rail down the throat of an unsuspecting and unwilling public. David Rogers also mentions the $1.5 billion already allocated in HR 2095 in the fall, but portrays it as a modest George W. Bush policy in comparison with Obama's alleged spending spree. In truth, Bush's hands were de facto tied by the fact that it was tacked onto an omnibus rail safety bill coming on the heels of the Chatsworth disaster, just before an election that put a lot of GOP seats in the House and Senate in play. HSR was something that was forced down his throat by a veto-proof bipartisan majority in both houses.

While it's true that there was little discussion of HSR as a new direction in transportation/energy/environmental policy in the national media both during and after the election campaign, the same is not true of California and possibly other parts of the country. Perhaps Rogers should look beyond the beltway from time to time.

Especially considering that the public strongly supports high speed rail. The Politico article makes it sound like Obama and Rahm Emanuel cut some kind of backroom deal for the HSR funding, that it was done merely to give Obama some sort of "signature project". But in fact, Obama was actually doing what the people asked him to do.

Back in January the Obama transition team put together the Citizens Briefing Book on Change.gov, allowing the public to vote for the policy proposals they liked best. High speed rail funding was one of the top vote-getters, and one of the very few to actually elicit a video response, in which Obama promised to fund HSR. Which he has now done. Our new president opened up his administration to the people, they told him what he wanted, and they did it. Imagine that!

Obama wasn't sneaking anything in at the last minute here - he was just following orders. Our orders.

The piece goes on to say the Obama will ask for an additional $1 billion (egads!) per year for HSR in the general budgets for the next five years. First off, he's got another election to contest in 2012 and so far, he's not spoken about any specific plans related to a possible second term. Second, Rogers may be confusing Amtrak grants with HSR capital projects. The sum he is in a tizzy about wouldn't be large enough to deliver HSR infrastructure in the 11 already designated corridors. For that, Congress would have to appropriate at least ten times as much annually for the next 20 years.

The $1b/year number appears at odds with Rogers' claim that the President has suddenly embraced HSR as a new signature issues because the new electricity grid and renewable electricity generation have supposedly failed to capture the public's imagination. Again, the beltway bubble appears to be a reality distortion field.

Rogers also incorrectly states that the HSR money came from narrowing the focus of a business tax break. In fact, it came from re-allocations and narrowing the focus of funding in the transportation section of the bill: the original House bill contained $30b for highways, $2b for fixed guideways and $1b at the discretion of the Secr. of Transportation, subject to a competitive bidding process. The Nadler amendment increased that latter number to $2.5b. The Senate's version allocated the $2b to a specific type of fixed guideway, namely HSR. It also moved $3b out of the highway budget and into the discretionary pot, increasing it to $5.5b. At the President's request, this potential slush fund was also allocated to a specific type of transportation spending, namely HSR. The remaining $500 million came from shifting funding for brand-new local transit services to HSR and Amtrak. If you add it all together, aggregate transportation spending was actually reduced to help make room for the AMT patch that the three GOP senators demanded. Math is hard.

More credibly, Rogers states that spending the money will take time and be complicated by freight rail operators that own most of the nation's existing railroad tracks. He seems blissfully unaware of the single biggest HSR project out there, the one in California, which actually involves laying hundreds of miles of brand-new, dedicated and electrified tracks. CHSRA made a shrewd political move in deciding to run the system on renewable electricity alone, because that makes the California system an even better fit for the President's policy objectives.

Note that railroad ROWs could even be critical to building the new, smart electricity grid (presumably based on HVDC trunk lines) and, that the railroads themselves could be (partially) electrified in the process. The technical hurdle is the minimum safe distance between high voltage (hundreds of kV) DC transmission lines (exposed or shielded and buried) and 25kV AC overhead catenaries, especially if both systems depend on electrical ground for the return path. Lightning arcs between the tow systems are another risk that would have to be reliably avoided.

That said, there are indeed serious ROW issues with legacy freight operators even in the California project, especially the sections of the preferred route that depend on UPRR's co-operation: SJ-Gilroy, Stockton-Fresno, Bakersfield-Palmdale (except Tehachapi Pass) and, Redondo Junction-Colton. The Fremont-Stockton section of the HSR overlay through Altamont Pass would also involve a UPRR ROW.

In the Central Valley, it's possible that CHSRA will be able to cut a deal with BNSF for Stockton-Fresno to overcome opposition by UPRR. The route section Fresno-Bakersfield, Palmdale-LA-Anaheim-Irvine (except for the run-through tracks at LA US) and Miramar-San Diego all depend on BNSF sharing its ROW anyhow, but that company is more willing to negotiate than UPRR.

In any case, Obama's HSR move shows that he really is going to put his money where his mouth is - and that when the public demands sustainable transportation, our president will listen.

What Do You Want in 10 Years: Oil Rigs or HSR?

The news cycle today is heavy on the Bush-McCain plan to lift the moratorium on offshore oil drilling. It's a junkie's fix of an idea - even though cheap oil is vanishing for good, let's risk major environmental and economic damage so we can have another few years of oil, and maybe bring the price of oil down by a couple bucks per barrel!

Along with that objection, the oil from these offshore sources won't even reach consumers for ten years, according to a recent US Energy Department study. "Production would not begin until 2017," the study says of offshore oil specifically. All while global demand continues to rise and production from major fields such as Mexico's Gulf fields and the North Sea drops dramatically. To visualize the impact of Arctic National Wildlife Refuge oil, for example, on supply:



By 2017, however, at least a few segments of high speed rail will be open. And if the politicians can keep their act together and ensure that LA-SF remains a focus of the HSR project, Californians will be able to take the train between those two cities soon after 2017.

So what option makes sense for California in ten years' time? Extracting a relatively small amount of oil off the coast which will not provide much if any cost savings at a major financial risk (from oil spills), or building a high speed rail system that runs on sustainable energy thereby liberating Californians traveling within their state from dependence on oil?

I don't see how there can be any debate on this.

PS: Matthew James Melzer of the NARP was on Warren Olney's Which Way LA? show tonight to discuss high speed rail, along with Quentin Kopp and Stuart Flashman. Although it's impossible to drink Warren's milkshake Kopp did a good job shooting down the "Union Pacific objections will screw with the HSR system" by pointing out that UP ROW was never going to be relied on - we're going to use their corridor, which is of course not the ROW. Flashman ridiculously argued that HSR can't be so close to freight rail incase of derailment, which as Kopp pointed out is not a problem in Europe.

Melzer nailed the case for HSR - shifting the discussion back to the big picture and reminding people that the cost of doing nothing is not zero. Melzer said that these kinds of conflicts - that over UP, over AB 3034 - are common to large public works projects and that they'll be worked through. We need to attend to the details, but not let the details distract us from the bigger picture. Well done.

Clueless in Contra Costa County

Today's Contra Costa Times editorial on high speed rail is one of the most ignorant things written about the project in the state media this year. There really is no other way to put it.

CALIFORNIA FACES A huge budget shortfall, a weakening economy, a home foreclosure mess, a drought and the need to expand its reservoir system. Tax increases loom even as businesses are downsizing and inflation threatens a comeback.

Problems are apparent right from the start. They frame the budget shortfall as a force of nature, instead of a product of political failure. The deficit can be closed with some tax solutions here and there - it's not a difficult project. More importantly, as I explained last month, the budget deficit and the high speed rail bonds are totally separate. The CC Times isn't the only outlet to conflate them - all the time when discussing the project with Californians I hear folks say "sure, but what about the budget deficit?"

The problem we face in California is the mistaken assumption that the budget deficit is the product of a spending problem. The LA Times is the most egregious offender here but it's a problem shared by the rest of the state media. The result is that even though California faces a profound crisis - our economy is on the verge of a severe and prolonged recession thanks in large part to the high cost of transportation, not to mention the impact of climate change - our unwillingness to solve the budget deficit is going to lead us to not undertake necessary projects for our long-term future. Because California's political leaders and the media that cover them prefer the slow decay of the status quo to positive change, they would have us sit here and do nothing.

Amid all these challenges, California voters will be asked to approve $10 billion in bonds in November to open the way for the Boondoggle Express. It's a high-speed, high-hopes rail line from San Francisco to Los Angeles that is short on planning and long on fantasy.

This suggests the editorial writer does not know what he or she is talking about. At all. It's a growing problem with newspaper editorials, which are becoming seen as an area where normal journalistic standards and basic intellectual honesty no longer apply. The HSR project has been the subject of extensive studies, none of which the editorial writer bothered to read. The notion that HSR is "fantasy" ignores decades of global HSR success. The only fantasy here is that California can avoid catastrophe by NOT building HSR.

Of course, $10 billion is only the beginning. Another $23 billion will be sought from a deficit-ridden federal government and private investors wary of a recession. The cost of the high-speed train is estimated at $33 billion for the main line, with an additional $7 billion for spur lines to Sacramento and San Diego.

Does anyone who has followed the saga of the Bay Bridge debacle really believe the high-speed rail system will cost less than $60 billion, $80 billion?

But even at $40 billion, this is a boondoggle that would dwarf the Big Dig in Boston and the Bay Bridge fleecing combined.

This is part of the usual carelessness with facts that we see from the state media. They assume that big projects inherently run over budget, just because they're big. But they don't. The Bay Bridge East Span, which is being referred to here, soared to a $1.4 billion cost because of a series of design changes and errors, as well as inflation in the cost of construction materials. They ignore the rail projects, such as LA's Gold Line or Seattle's CenterLink, which are being delivered on-time and on-budget. Further, they cannot just pull random figures out of their air - there will be inflation in construction materials, that impacts projects around the globe, but where do they get off using $60 or $80 billion?

The US government maybe "deficit-ridden" but that should not stop a necessary infrastructure project. If that logic had applied 70 years ago we wouldn't have even built the Bay Bridge. Nor the Hoover Dam. Nor the Grand Coulee Dam. Deficit spending to provide jobs in a recession and long-term growth to ensure economic recovery is smart economics. Spending billions on HSR will have exactly the same long-term impact that the bridges and dams did.

The fantasy of duplicating a 200-plus mph rail system like the one in Japan or France through the Central Valley has been around for awhile. But soon voters will be asked to approve real money to fulfil it.

Again, the only fantasy here is that California can survive without building an alternative to oil-based transportation. Nowhere in this editorial are gas prices mentioned. Nowhere is the airline crisis mentioned. This editorial sounds like it was written in 1995, not 2008.

One might think by now that the high-speed rail plans for construction, operation and investment have been worked out in great detail with considerable confidence in their success. Even after spending $58 million over a decade in planning, that is decidedly not the case.

A week ago, a California Senate panel blew what should be a warning whistle for voters. Its report questions the financial assumptions made by the California High-Speed Rail Authority and urges significant changes to its plan to develop a 700-mile bullet train system.

"Neither the authority's 2000 business plan nor any of the agency's subsequent documents discuss the risks that might be associated with the project," charges the 27-page report by the Senate Transportation and Housing Committee.

As we discussed last week that Senate report is extremely flawed. Its assessment of financial risk is worthless, because it did not actually assess financial risks. Had it done so it would have graphed the supposed risks of HSR against the risks of not building it - of letting our airlines collapse and the state become paralyzed by a lack of affordable transportation. That the HSR deniers at the Contra Costa Times are using that report to attack HSR suggests how flawed the report was, and how important it is we push back against it.

The report says the rail authority needs to demonstrate greater financial transparency and accountability. In addition, the report urges CHSRA to present an updated business plan prior to the November election so that voters are fully aware of financial risks before they vote on the $10 billion bond measure.

We support an updated business plan, although we do not believe it to be necessary for approval of the November bond. Of course, being "fully aware of financial risks" involves including an assessment of the cost of doing nothing - which neither the State Senate nor this editorial offered. By their logic, the editorial is flawed, since it lacks that risk assessment.

These risks go to the heart of the system, including construction cost increases, less-than expected ridership or revenue, difficulty attracting private financial backers or acquiring land and the possibility that the state might have to subsidize the service.

Construction costs WILL increase if we delay. Approving the bonds now is actually the far less risky approach, as it would allow contracts to be signed sooner and locking in more affordable prices.

But here they give away their real concern: omg subsidies!

EVERY form of transportation in this state is subsidized. Every last one. Amtrak CEO Alex Kummant, in an excellent Reuters interview I'll cover more this weekend, has a brilliant response to this:

"I think it is absolute mythology that there's any national system that is profitable. And I think the naysayers just have to get over it. There is no example. If you peel apart the British rail privatization, there were a tremendous numbers of problems with that. People say Oh look at these wonderful new trains running around here. It's all because of the miracle of the private market.' That's complete nonsense. There's a bunch of new trains running around there because they spent five times as much tax money today as they did in 1990. And actually if you look at the subsidy structures, we are awash in subsidies for all modes of transportation. There's a $10 billion a year cash transfer from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund. FAA gets $2.7 billion. We pay all security at Amtrak and yet there is a $1.5 billion subsidy that goes beyond any user fees for security in air travel.

There's $8 billion that goes into security and life safety for cruise ships. There's four-plus billion dollars that goes to waterways. Let's not even get into airport construction which is a miasma of state, federal and local tax breaks and tax refinancing and God knows what. And then there's private aviation which gets huge subsidies in accelerated depreciation loss for small aircraft. So I always get a good chuckle, if I'm in a good mood, when people talk about subsidized Amtrak. It's always a lot of fun then to reel off every other mode that is subsidized. And one final point. If you actually look at the amount of public capital that flows into the rail network per passenger, it's like $40 a passenger for Amtrak and $500 to $700 per automobile out there through the highways.

Of course, their concern is that HSR subsidies might break the CA budget. But all other HSR systems in the world generate surpluses and do not require subsidies - in fact they subsidize other rail services. There is every reason to expect this will occur here in California - unless of course you're the Contra Costa Times and ignore $4.50 gas. More from their silly editorial:

f the Senate panel that studied the high-speed rail system is uncertain of its costs, investors, federal aid and income, certainly voters should be.

We have long been wary of high-speed rail in California. It would make more sense in a more densely populated area like the Boston-to-Washington, D.C., corridor than in California.

Nonsense. Spain's AVE system, which has high ridership and generates surpluses, serves a much less densely populate corridor. And of course this assumes that folks won't ride HSR between California's major metro areas, even though the State Senate HSR report they put so much stock in claimed this would generate the most riders and profits for the system.

Besides, this state has a poor record of completing huge construction projects anywhere near budget or estimated date of completion.

We do? Care to give some examples? There are one or two outliers - like the East Span of the Bay Bridge - but they ignore those I mentioned above that were quite successful, such as the West Span of the Bay Bridge or the Metro Gold Line.

We also have no confidence in claims that the train could carry passengers at a lower price than the airlines without subsidies, nor nearly as quickly.

Of course you don't have that confidence - because you're ignoring the fuel price problem that is causing the airline industry to enter its most severe crisis since 2001. And during that crisis, how did airlines survive? With a $15 billion subsidy. Even Southwest Airlines CEO Herb Kelleher doesn't think affordable airfare is going to last much longer. What does the Contra Costa Times know that he doesn't?

Then there is the major problem with the route, which serves the 1.3 million people in San Francisco and the Peninsula far better than the 2.5 million residents of the East Bay.

A statement conveniently ignoring the HSR corridor along the Altamont route, or the millions of others in California who this will quite easily serve.

Adding to the uncertainty about the bullet train project is Union Pacific Railroad's unwillingness to sell its right of way for high-speed rail routes. That could delay construction and be a major financial setback.

And if the editorial writer knew what he or she was talking about he might know that the CHSRA never counted on that ROW.

This report is a loud and clear warning to all California voters not to be too eager to get aboard the Boondoggle Express.

Whereas this editorial is a loud and clear warning to all California voters that the state media cannot be trusted to reliably report on and understand the high speed rail project, and would prefer to protect a failing status quo by ignoring the transportation crisis being created by high fuel costs. The editorial fails to assess the true risk of the project - the risk of doing nothing. It's the equivalent of editorializing against the Bay Bridge in 1933 or the State Water Project in 1959 - shortsighted and damaging to this state's needs.