Showing posts with label UPRR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UPRR. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

A Closer Look at San José to Merced

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

Last night the CHSRA held a public meeting in San José to discuss the plans for what may well be the most challenging segment of the entire SF-Anaheim route: the San José to Merced segment. The battles north of here, on the Peninsula, have gotten a lot of attention, but that segment is much more straightforward - the route has already been chosen (Caltrain ROW) and it's now just a matter of how you implement it.

Further south, the situation is much more complex, additionally so because it is this segment for which the judge ruled the EIR was inadequate in Atherton v. CHSRA, specifically the matter of using UPRR ROW between San José Diridon and Gilroy.

As a result, some of the key route decisions are still very much up in the air. And here too you have NIMBYs fighting what seem to be the most commonsense solutions, including the Gardner neighborhood (which, I should correct, did actually exist before the railroad - the neighborhood was subdivided in the 1880s and again in the 1900s, whereas the SP line was built during the Depression in the mid-1930s). Down in south Santa Clara County Gilroy residents have voiced concerns about using the existing rail alignment, especially based on the factually incorrect statement that trains would run at 220mph through central Gilroy. And there is the matter of a protected grassland near Los Banos that the HSR trains are currently planned to use.

The CHSRA produced a useful document showing the alignment options along this segment, focusing on the three toughest parts: how you get from Diridon Station to either the UPRR ROW or Highway 101; how you run trains through Morgan Hill/Gilroy, and the Los Banos section.

One of our commenters, Peter, attended the San José meeting last night and had these comments, shared in the comments to yesterday's post and reproduced here:

The presenters were brutally honest regarding expected noise levels, eminent domain, frequency of trains, etc.

People definitely preferred the relatively straight tunnel at an angle to Diridon as the alignment they thought the Authority should adopt. They weren't very concerned that it meant the station would be over 100 feet underground.

They were very surprised to hear the maximum permissible noise levels for freight trains (the locomotive) at 55 mph and HSR at 150 mph are the same at 90 dba. The freight cars can apparently be even louder.

They were very upset at the planned peak level of operations of 11 tph in each direction. They were upset despite the fact that the presenter made clear that this was for 2035.

In other words, HSR through the Gardner and Willow Glen areas wouldn't be louder than the existing trains, and like their counterparts on the Peninsula, believe they have some right to dictate the operations of the train corridor (which they don't). Peter continued:

And when I say above that the presenters were "brutally honest," I mean that when they didn't have the answer yet and had not yet studied the issue in-depth enough to have an answer, they said so.

I know people are going to claim they were hiding things, but I just didn't get that impression.

The presenters stated that they were shooting to go as fast as they could between Diridon and Gilroy. It sounded like they liked the idea of the curve around Morgan Hill in order to enable them to possibly 220 mph.

There was one crazy still trying to get Altamont, and he even had a handout ("This is a better choice")with an alignment splitting in Pleasanton and one spur going south to San Jose International and another going via a Transbay Tube and ending beneath SFO.

Two San Jose Board of Supervisors members were there and they made their pitch for the "straighter" tunnel alignment that allowed the trains to go faster, and oh, by the way, would mean they would be out of sight, out of mind.

Oh, and supposedly they are now considering a Morgan Hill station instead of Gilroy....they are considering the Morgan Hill station because the City of Morgan Hill asked them to. All of the alignment alternatives raised are being considered because they have to be. I highly doubt they'll put a station in Morgan Hill, same as I think a 100 foot deep underground station at Diridon is ludicrous.

Here again I'll say the same thing I said about the Palo Alto HSR design workshop: if San José and/or Santa Clara County want a tunnel from Diridon Station southward, they need to come up with a way to pay for it. That strikes me as even less likely given that the county is already on the hook for a multibillion dollar tunnel, to bring BART to downtown San José.

As Clem noted, the CHSRA does listen to and incorporate public feedback - in this case, the "Thread the Needle" plan floated by Gardner/Willow Glen residents, which as you can see on the image below, has been incorporated by the CHSRA as an alignment option:



The simplest solution to me looks like the existing Caltrain corridor through the Gardner neighborhood. If residents want another solution, whether a costly tunnel or a costly and tightly-curved aerial structure shown in green, they'll have to find a way to pay for it. It's not government's nor the public's job to subsidize their home values.

For getting the trains out of central San José, there's the issue of what to do if the UPRR ROW along Monterey Highway is unavailable. The solution as proposed below involves using the Highway 87 and Highway 85 corridors.



I wish I had more specifics on this, because those corridors are already being used by VTA light rail. I do not believe it is either wise or desirable to sacrifice VTA light rail for HSR, and the cost of widening the ROW along both routes would be quite high. Still, if there's no federal pressure put on UPRR to come to an agreement about the ROW, this may have to be explored.

Next up is Morgan Hill, where a station is being considered at the request of the city of Morgan Hill:



As Rafael noted, a Morgan Hill station would not be optimal for those of us living in the Monterey Bay Area (and there are almost a million of us, not an inconsequential number). A Gilroy station is both ideal and still the most likely option.

Of course, the other interesting thing about this map is the possibility of following the Highway 101 corridor. I drive that corridor pretty frequently, including last Saturday, when I took a close look at the options for placing HSR tracks alongside the road. This is very doable. The east side of 101 has more space in the Morgan Hill area, and the west side has more space through San Martin. Because the 101 corridor here is straight and not built up, unlike the Peninsula, it strikes me as an appropriate place to put HSR tracks.

I'm skipping over the slide on the Pacheco Pass and moving directly to the Los Banos region, where a wide range of options are on the table:



As you can see, there are three main issues here: Can the CHSRA build through the grassland? What do you do with the wye at Chowchilla? And can you use the UPRR/Highway 99 alignment? I have no strong preferences here, although the Firebaugh alignment would seem to rule out a maintenance hub at Merced.

Obviously there's quite a lot going on here. To me the best solution is to use the existing Caltrain ROW through Gardner, use federal mediation to reach an accommodation with UPRR in the Monterey Highway area and along the Highway 99 corridor, and use the straightest and most direct route through a narrow portion of the grassland.

I would prefer the HSR trains go through central Morgan Hill and particularly central Gilroy. Those cities are under intense pressure to build urban sprawl, and an HSR station in downtown Gilroy, where the existing Caltrain station is located, would instead help channel that growth back into the existing urban center. That being said, I'm open to a 101 alignment, especially east of Morgan Hill, if that can enable trains to go at a faster speed.

Saturday, September 5, 2009

Fear and Loathing in San Jose (Revisited)

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

by Rafael

Heads up #1: The Sep 12 teach-in on high speed rail organized by the Peninsula Cities Consortium has been moved to a new location due to high demand. The event is free, but anyone wishing to attend must now register at the above web site due to limited capacity. (h/t Morris Brown)

Heads up #2: The TJPA as about to hold its monthly meeting for the Citizens Advisory Committee. The agenda includes updates on ARRA funding as well as the design of the DTX tunnel and throat. The meeting is open to the general public, but if you're not a member of the CAC and plan to attend, it might be a good idea to call the TJPA at 415.597.4620 (or email info@transbaycenter.org) to check if there will be room for you. Lobbyists may have to register with the city of SF first.

Date: Tue Sep 8
Time: 3:30pm - 7:30pm
Location: TJPA offices, 201 Mission Street (at Beale), Suite 2100, San Francisco, CA, in the Large Conference Room



In my recent post Fear and Loathing in San Jose, I suggested that one alternative to the UPRR/Monterey Hwy corridor would be to cut over to the available 101 median via the also available 280 median. At the time, I thought an underground station and tunnel to east of the 87/280 interchange would be the only possibility.

On closer examination, I now believe a variation of this alignment might just barely be possible above ground, drastically reducing the cost while also avoiding south San Jose neighborhoods entirely. The station would still be at an angle to both Caltrain and BART, but located further north than before. Its supports would have to be positioned such that they don't interfere with the future BART tracks, which will wrap around the HP Pavilion underground en route to the future station and maintenance yard in Santa Clara. They must also avoid conflicts with the underground VTA light rail tracks. That's going to be tight. My drawing reserves about 80 feet of width for the station, that's for two tracks plus extra-generous island or side platform(s). There is no need for more than two HSR tracks at San Jose Diridon.


View SJ Diridon: HSR above ground, south via 280/101 in a larger map

The alignment would parallel UPRR's via an aerial above Montgomery St. (with double glazing sound walls) and veer east onto I-280 at the Auzerais Ave intersection. It would reach that median just west of the 87/280 interchange via a tight curve (~1000 ft radius). There is ~1600ft of run length between the Bird Ave westbound off-ramp (which trains must fly over) and the overpass from 280 east onto 87 north (which trains should pass under). At 3.5% gradient, that distance may be just enough to achieve the required elevation change of ~50 feet, factoring in the need for vertical transition curves at either end.

The curve at the 101/280 interchange is just as tight and just as gnarly. Trains would have to pass under the tall southbound overpass turnoff from 680 south onto 101 south and then immediately climb at 3.5% so they can pass over Story Rd. Again, I'm threading the needle here.

In both cases, the small curve radius coupled with the steep gradient means the achievable speeds will be quite low: assuming 5" track cant plus 7" cant deficiency, the maximum permissible speed on a curve with 1000ft radius is just 55mph. Note that current FRA rules limit track cant to just 3" but that's based on the assumption the track will be used for heavy freight trains, which is not the case here.

Since most trains will be stopping at SJ Diridon anyhow, that's primarily an issue for the SF-LA non-stop line haul time: combined with the additional 2 miles, this alignment would add 2-3 minutes. The exact penalty depends on technically feasible speeds in the 101 median vs. politically feasible ones in a ROW in the UPRR/Monterey Hwy corridor. There are ways to compensate for the penalty, e.g. straighten some curves further north. AB3034 requires CHSRA to deliver an SF-LA line haul time of 2 hours 40 minutes, which is already quite aggressive.

In south Gilroy, the least disruptive solution would be to follow 101 until it's no longer designated a freeway and then use an aerial to cut across farmland over the UPRR central coast line, twice across hwy 25 and finally across the UPPR spur to Hollister before descending back to grade following the original alignment to Pacheco Pass.


View SJ Diridon: HSR above ground, south via 280/101 in a larger map

Note: CHSRA's alignment for cost estimation purposes included a trench plus tunnel under the Caltrain tracks between San Tomas Expressway in Santa Clara and Julian St. in San Jose. I've shortened that to Taylor St. by swiping the westernmost CEMOF tracks and running at grade there. That's cheeky but Caltrain can almost certainly make do without those tracks. Bellarmine College Prep High School should not be impacted by the change.

In terms of overall cost for SJ - Gilroy, this revised alignment via I-280 and US-101 might actually be cheaper than the one CHSRA has proposed. It avoids running through numerous San Jose neighborhoods, does not rely on purchasing ROW from UPRR, avoids five grade crossings between Diridon station and Bernal Ave, avoids the existing overpass at San Carlos St. and, it avoids many additional grade crossings south of San Jose as well as aerials through the downtown areas of Morgan Hill and Gilroy and that tunnel section under CEMOF. Plus, there won't be any room for a "Grand Central of the West" station with numerous platform tracks. Two with generous platforms will do just fine, it's a through station not a terminal.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Fear and Loathing in San Jose

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

by Rafael

We can't stop here. This is bat BART country.

The recent Initial Ruling On Atherton vs. CHSRA highlighted the issue of ROW acquisition, especially if that might involve exercising eminent domain. There's been a lot of speculation about the possible implications for the route out of the Bay Area and even the project as a whole. However, the plain truth is that it's now up to the judge to spell out the remedial actions CHSRA must take to bring the program level of its EIR process for the Bay Area to Central Valley section back into compliance.

One aspect that will surely have to be addressed is the issue of exactly where and how to run dedicated HSR tracks between San Jose Diridon and Gilroy, a topic I'll explore below. First though, let's recap why CHSRA preferred a route that goes through San Jose at all.

Economic Objectives

San Jose likes to bill itself as the "Capital of Silicon Valley", which actually stretches from San Jose all the way up to San Mateo and across to Cupertino. Much of the so-called "Golden Triangle" portion, bordered by US-101, I-880 and CA-237, actually lies in Santa Clara and to a lesser extent, in Milpitas. However, most of Silicon Valley is chock-full of high-tech computer hardware and software companies, ranging from highly innovative startups to global leaders in the computing and internet industries. Along with agriculture and the movie/TV industry, Silicon Valley is a primary economic engine for the state.

Both directly and indirectly, tax revenue from these companies and their workforce will contribute a large fraction of the funding for the California HSR project. Paradoxically, wealth is both why HSR has to serve Silicon Valley and why CHSRA is facing opposition to an alignment with elevated sections in the SF peninsula.

San Jose has about a million residents, making it the country's tenth-largest city. However, a significant fraction of Silicon Valley's highly skilled workforce neither lives nor works within city limits, a situation San Jose's civic leaders would like to change. The General Plan shows the location of these limits and also the city's development pattern. Most of the built-up area is "medium low density residential", though there are some higher-density developments here and there. A sizeable area just south-east of the SJC airport is blighted by aircraft noise and FAA-imposed maximum building heights. It is used by the US Army and for Guadeloupe Park.

The Diridon station lies just west of the flight path and, high-density residential housing has been/is being built just west of it. However, except for Caltrain's CEMOF maintenance facility and the HP Pavilion, long-standing efforts to attract commercial development between the station and CA-87 haven't been as successful. Back lots and at-grade parking lots are plentiful. Caltrain ridership into and out of Diridon station has historically been low for that very reason. In conjunction with the BART extension, HSR is supposed to deliver what Caltrain never could: attract commercial and residential development to the mid-town and downtown areas within approx. 1/2 mile of the station.

Note that neither HSR nor the long-sought BART extension are fully funded at this point and that there's no reason to believe airport blight will abate.

Transit Oriented Development

Nevertheless, San Jose is giving this another try and hosting a visioning workshop for the Diridon station area:

Date: Saturday, Sept. 12, 2009
Time: 9:00-12:00
Location: Parkside Hall, Room B (west of Tech Museum of Innovation), 180 Park Ave

(Note that as reported earlier, the Innovation Place HSR Workshop in Palo Alto will be held on the same day from 9:00am-3:30pm. See also Clem's post Palo Alto Innovates)

Separate plans for transit-oriented development already exist or are in development for Santa Clara, Beryessa, Fremont Warm Springs, Union City and Fremont Centerville (context: Dumbarton Rail + Amtrak CC/ACE). All of these are supposed to boost ridership into the downtown-midtown area of San Jose and, to connect to HSR at Diridon station.

HSR Phase 1: San Francisco, San Jose and Points In-Between

Whether all of these plans for rail transit and transit-oriented development will come to fruition or fail to attract sufficient funding remains to be seen. However, while the wording of AB3034 would technically permit CHSRA to exclude San Jose from phase 1 or even from later phases, any attempt to do so would face massive political opposition on account of the above. Note that the bill, which was the basis of prop 1A(2008), specifically requires the starter line of the HSR network to terminate at the San Francisco Transbay Terminal. Therefore, terminating it San Jose for now as some have proposed would require the state legislators to amend the bill with a 2/3 majority in both houses and probably, a new ballot proposition to approve that amendment. San Francisco would never allow that to happen.

Ergo, for all intents and purposes, both SF and SJ need to be served by HSR in phase 1. The most straightforward way to do that is to leverage the PCJPA's Caltrain ROW and cross over into the Central Valley via Pacheco Pass. Since Caltrain "baby bullet" service takes 57 minutes between these two cities and AB3034 explicitly mandates that express HSR trains do it in just 30, the plan of record is to quad-track the entire ROW, even though narrow ROW sections such as downtown San Mateo present major engineering challenges if eminent domain is to be avoided at all costs. A second complication is that even if FRA gives Caltrain a waiver to operate mixed traffic (new non-compliant electric EMUs + a few legacy diesels for SJ-Gilroy + UPRR freight trains) at up to 79mph, it almost certainly won't give CHSRA the same luxury in the related but separate "rule of special applicability".

So, for both regulatory and capacity reasons, the intent is to upgrade the Caltrain corridor for mostly two tracks to a full four everywhere. Building just HSR tracks in another peninsula corridor, US-101, was considered but rejected due to constructability issues (lack of available medians) and because the corridor doesn't run near the desired stations. Also, this option would have done nothing to fully grade separate and electrify Caltrain, nor could peninsula residents have transferred to long-distance HSR trains at selected stations between SF and SJ.

Approaches into San Jose Diridon

South of San Tomas Expressway in Santa Clara, CHSRA's Google map of the route (please zoom in) shows an expensive trench/tunnel section to just north of SJ Diridon. Presumably, that's just two tracks reserved for HSR, so Caltrain would remain at grade (it's already grade separated in the area). Also note that the HSR tracks need to cross over or under the UPRR tracks somewhere between Santa Clara and Gilroy. Doing so in Santa Clara isn't possible because the BART tracks will run east of UPRR's line as far south as West Santa Clara Street, immediately north of Diridon station. Present plans therefore call for HSR to stay west of the Caltrain tracks. Note that tracks will need to emerge to the surface north of W. Julian St. since that's an existing underpass and tracks need run length to fan out to the platform tracks on the new deck above the Caltrain/UPRR tracks.

CHSRA's plan of record calls for a mix of aerials, embankments and cut/fill sections to cross I-280 and reach Gilroy via the UPRR/Monterey Hwy corridor. In some sections, the UPRR ROW might have to be widened via acquisition of land or air rights from private property owners - via eminent domain if need be. Failure to qualify the risk of such takings was one of the complaints the judge upheld in Atherton vs. CHSRA.

The track fan south of Diridon station can merge west, east or directly above the UPRR tracks, as desired. However, note that W San Carlos St. is currently an overpass. It would have to be converted to an underpass to keep HSR tracks from having to change elevation yet again. However, there's probably a good reason is was built as an overpass to begin with. Also, it's not clear if all of the HSR-related grade separation works shown on CHSRA's Google map are strictly for the new HSR tracks or would also include the legacy tracks used for UPRR freight, Caltrain and Amtrak Coast Starlight. By default, the latter might be preferable, but also much more difficult to construct (shoofly tracks). Given the low total volume of FRA-compliant traffic between San Jose and Gilroy - just 6 freight, 6 Caltrains and 2 Amtrak trains - it may well be acceptable to retain grade crossings for the legacy tracks only.

Since UPRR declined to entertain an offer because of supposed safety concerns, it cannot credibly pretend they've magically gone away even CHSRA were to offer it the moon. At the very least, there would have to be some engineering studies to determine if a given implementation proposed by CHSRA meets UPRR's criteria, which it hasn't even spelled out yet. This could drag on for years even if price were no longer an issue.

Ergo, UPRR's decision not to offer up any of its ROW nor air rights above it south of Lick (Caltrain's Tamien Yard, just north of Almaden Expwy/87) means CHSRA will have to secure land/air rights nearby, if only to avoid delaying the project. This will be tricky to achieve without eminent domain, especially near the gated communities just south of Curtner Ave, which is an overpass. Note that a VTA light rail line runs in the CA-87 and CA-85 medians.

Alternative to the UPRR ROW

However, the medians of both I-280 and US-101 are still available. Freeway medians are usually narrow, possibly limiting the maximum safe speed to below what CHSRA was counting on for a given section of the route. BART trains aren't constrained, but then their top speed is 79mph to begin with. As always the devil is in the details, i.e. exactly how many feet of width are available. Google Map's satellite view doesn't provide that level of precision.

The hardest part would be the section between W Santa Clara St and just east of the gnarly I-280/CA-87 interchange. Overpasses there may not be tall enough to permit HSR trains to run underneath, so it's better to avoid it altogether. In addition, HSR trains are limited to gradients of 3.5% and need generous curve radii at elevated speeds, so an entry point west of the interchange would be ambitious.

A deceptively simple solution would be to keep the HSR tracks underground south of CEMOF all the way to east of the interchange. Once you've bitten the bullet and gone underground, there are advantages to staying there. However, it would also put the SJ station underground, with full-length (1/4mi) platforms placed at an angle relative to those of both Caltrain and BART. There would be no need for architectural Viagra on the surface, not that need ever had anything to do with it to begin with. However, in raw transportation terms, an underground station with as little as two run-through tracks and one large island or two generous side platforms would get the job done. Fortunately, the area is partly parking lots and the aforementioned visioning workshop - a very early stage of the urban planning process - hasn't even happened yet.

There's plenty of room to run west of the BART tracks curving around the HP Pavilion, but the HSR tracks actually need to run sufficiently deep to pass under the VTA light rail line that already crosses under the Caltrain/UPRR tracks. HSR would also need to cross under the Guadeloupe River, a residential district, CA-87 and a second creek before emerging in the I-280 median. Note that the HSR tracks would also need to run either west of or else under the future BART tracks.

In other words, the HSR line and platforms would have to be very deep underground anyhow. Since San Jose is a through station anyhow, perhaps a single extra-wide island or two generous side platforms would actually be sufficient. Trains run past platforms in Europe and Japan at fairly high speed all the time. Waiting passengers are simply warned to retreat to a safe distance via the PA system and markings on the floor. The VTA tracks would prevent a full concourse level, but none is needed anyhow. Multiple pedestrian connections to the surface, to BART, Caltrain and the VTA station would be sufficient. Some of these passages could feature moving walkways to reduce transfer times. ADA compatibility would be achieved via elevators, but ramps or inclined moving walkways are more reliable in case a wheelchair user needs to be evacuated.

At the anyhow pre-blighted I-280/US-101 interchange, the cheapest solution would be a tall aerial to transition between the medians. However, it would have to fly over a descending overpass lane, so it would be a tall structure. Still, the incremental visual and noise impacts should be minor. The alternative would be to execute the transition underground, but that's more expensive.

Optional Extension through Altamont Pass

Tunneling under the I-280/US-101 interchange only makes sense if there is a desire to leverage all the work that was put into reaching the I-280 median for something else: a turnoff to continue east to I-680, whose median is also still available - all the way to the foot of the Sunol grade in Fremont, actually.

If Caltrans is prepared to reserve that median for HSR trains, it could be the basis for a future shortcut to Sacramento via Altamont Pass. Between Scott Creek Rd and E Warren Ave in Fremont Warm Springs, the tracks would veer east and across to Haynes Gulch via a long tunnel under Monument Peak. There, they would veer north, running essentially at grade next to Calaveras Rd. as far as the CA-84/Calaveras Rd exit off I-680. An aerial across the CA-84 and another tunnel would lead the tracks to an intermodal with BART at El Charro Rd in east Pleasanton/west Livermore. It would be heard to avoid impacts on both the nearby ponds and Livermore Municipal Airport, since crossing at grade is not feasible because of UPRR. Altmont Pass would be traversed - except for one short section - via the I-580 median. Passing north of Tracy, tracks would connect to the phase 2 spur to Sacramento near either Manteca or Escalon.

Optional Extension to Walnut Creek

Note that the I-680 median is still available between just north of the CA-84 exits to just south of the CA-24 interchange in Walnut Creek. A tunnel section under California Blvd. would be needed to create an intermodal with the BART station. However, that road features a tight chicane and there is a medical center next to the freeway. Tunnel tracks would have to thread a needle between its buildings. This would require a technical feasibility study as well as the consent of Kaiser Permanente regarding any number of issues, including construction nuisance and vibrations from passing trains. Eminent domain against a hospital is basically unheard of, so I'd consider the whole thing a long shot. However, even without an intermodal with BART, there would at least be HSR service to eastern Alameda and central Contra Costa county.

Maps for Alternative #1

The alternative ROW and extension options are shown on the map below. Switch to satellite mode to see why the HSR station would have to be deep underground. Zoom out in map mode to see the regional implications. Switch to terrain mode to see where there are mountains to contend with.

The picture below the map shows location of major known faults - basically, Calaveras Rd. and I-680 north of Sunol are right on top of the Calaveras fault. The Hayward fault generated the 1868 earthquake, estimated at 6.8 on the Richter scale. Paleoseismologists have estimated the mean time between such events on that particular fault to be 140 years, so statistically, it's due right around now. Perhaps it's not the most auspicious time to build a railroad, but the people of California have never allowed themselves to be paralyzed by a fear of Mother Nature. See our earlier post Shake, Rattle And Roll for more background on earthquake engineering in the railway industry.


View San Jose Diridon: HSR Underground in a larger map





Alternative #2

Since we're talking hypotheticals anyhow, here is a second alternative based on using 101 between SJ and Gilroy.

To come up with this one, I started in Gilroy and worked my way north. It quickly became apparent that the problem in San Jose could be addressed by simply moving the HSR station to the huge transit-oriented development at Beryessa and continuing north up the East Bay instead of the SF peninsula. CHSRA did study the scenario of SF + Oakland + SJ via Pacheco but not along this particular right of way, which does not depend on UPRR but precludes extending BART south. Moreover, whatever is gained in San Jose is lost (and then some) because the only available unused railroad right of way runs from Union City to just north of Oakland Coliseum. Reaching it from Fremont Irvington with full grade separation requires tunnels in Niles, tiptoeing around the water supply for 100,000 people.

The aforementioned available ROW runs right next to BART, but unfortunately its tracks cross over in three locations. That would greatly complicate the vertical alignment, though at least heavy freight does not impose any gradient constraints.

North of Oakland Coliseum, a few miles of greenfield ROW immediately next to BART would be required, complicated by the Fruitvale station and transit village. A tunnel under the Lake Merritt outflow and 4th Street in Oakland would need to pass under the east portals of the Webster/Posey road tunnels across to Alameda. The upside is an elevated intermodal station with West Oakland BART. Sanity would dictate that HSR terminate here in phase 1, after all downtown SF is just one BART stop away. However, as discussed above, AB3034 mandates a terminus in San Francisco Transbay Terminal. Since the station there is in the basement and the new east span of the Bay Bridge was redesigned specifically not to support the weight of BART/light rail/HSR trains, a second transbay tube would have to be part of the phase 1 specifications. Note that it could not cross the existing tube underwater.

As a result of all this, switching to the East Bay would be no easier than sticking with the peninsula. Multiple hard-fought political decisions would have to be reversed, multiple EIS/EIR processes re-done. Whatever ARRA is available for California HSR would be spent elsewhere in the state.

Summary:

- HSR up 101 from Gilroy ($)
- modest elevated San Jose HSR station at Beryessa TOD ($)
- VTA's WPML ROW used for HSR (priceless ;^)
- tunnel in Niles to reach UC BART (stacked single tracks, $$)
- dedicated HSR alignment next to BART ($$$, ROW incomplete, BART crosses three times)
- tunnel under Oakland's Chinatown ($$$)
- second transbay tube to San Francisco Transbay Terminal Center ($$$$)

Consolation prizes:

- BART extended to Livermore via I-580 ($$)
- Caltrain electrification SF-SJ Diridon ($$)
- VTA light rail subway under E Santa Clara St and up to Beryessa via track stacking on short section of WPML ($$$)

Canceled: BART to Santa Clara (-$$$$)
Canceled: BART maintenance facility in Santa Clara (-$$)
Canceled: widening Caltrain corridor (-$, -litigation-related delays)
Canceled: Dumbarton rail (ROW in Union City usurped by HSR) (-$$)

Shelved indefinitely: DTX tunnel in San Francisco (-$$$)
Pushed back to PCJPA: full grade separation of Caltrain corridor (-$$$)


View HSR up WPML instead of BART in a larger map

Basically, this Alternative #2 was an interesting exercise, but it would really put a pride of lions among the pigeons. The takeaway is that switching to the East Bay would solve some political issues in the mid-peninsula at the expense of a whole new set of headaches.

Alternative #1 is more limited in scope, it "just" completely reconfigures the SJ station and moves the one in Gilroy to the 101 median.



UPDATE: Alternative #3: Commenter BruceMcF (h/t) has suggested that stacking HSR and VTA light rail tracks in the 87/85 medians between Lick and the Santa Teresa district would be both feasible and cheaper than the alternatives discussed above.

There are multiple existing road overpasses, including Almaden Expressway and Blossom Hill Rd. next to the station there. The stacked tracks would have to fly over those, raising tracks very high. VTA light rail leaves the 87 median and forks tracks at Ohlone Chynoweth station next to the 85/87 interchange. It leaves the 85 median in the Santa Teresa district. Combined with station access issues, this favors stacking the HSR tracks on top of light rail.

However, that puts the (slightly) heavier HSR trains on top and increases noise emissions. HSR's maximum gradient is smaller than the one light rail vehicles can negotiate and, greater vertical transition radii are needed on account of the higher speed. Note that VTA light rail is triple-tracked in some sections and would be down to just two after the project. Separately, note that the 101 median is not available right at the 85/101 interchange but that land for tracks to hug the northbound on-ramp is. At an appropriate point further south, the alignment would cut back over into the median.

Note that VTA's daytime light rail operations would need to continue during the construction period.


View SJ Diridon to Gilroy via UPRR/87/85/101 in a larger map

Sunday, August 30, 2009

CHSRA and UPRR Are Talking

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

Whether it's a prelude to a grand bargain or not isn't clear, but Gary Richards is reporting in the Mercury News today that UPRR and the CHSRA have begun discussions about resolving the dispute over the ROW between San José and Gilroy:

Officials with the railroad and the California High Speed Rail Authority confirmed that they have held discussions in hopes of resolving their differences, which if not settled soon could cost the rail authority $3 billion in federal stimulus aid and state bond money, delay construction in Northern California and leave in doubt the electrification of Caltrain....

"Our position continues to be the same as what we've said in the past," Union Pacific spokesman Tom Lange said from Omaha, Neb. "The high speeds of these trains is simply not compatible in our right of way.

"We've had discussions with them, but the bottom line is that safety comes first and foremost."

There's been a lot of discussion in the comments about whether running HSR trains on tracks near the UPRR tracks, but not in their ROW, would pose a safety hazard of any sort. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't, but UPRR's position is clear, and with the recent ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA it's clear that the issue has to be revisited. So it is good to hear that UPRR and CHSRA are talking, but it is quite unclear what are the substance of the talks and whether or not there's any hope of forward momentum.

One problem is that the judge that issued the ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA, Michael Kenney, did not actually indicate what remedies the CHSRA must undertake to address the three specific problems with the EIR the judge found. Despite claims from Peninsula NIMBYs and HSR deniers like Richard Tolmach, the judge has not ruled that the entire EIR must be redone or that the judge found the choice of Pacheco Pass to connect the Bay Area to the Central Valley was flawed. And as Richards' article makes clear, time is of the essence:

Timing is critical — and that has some officials saying the railroad's stance is a negotiating ploy, partly because the line is lightly used. Currently, just 14 trains run each day between Gilroy and San Jose — six freight, six commuter and two Amtrak trains.

On Oct. 2, the rail authority plans to submit its application for federal stimulus money. It needs approval of those funds soon to meet Washington's requirement that construction be under way by 2012.

If the judge rules that the entire environmental study be revisited, "that could be the death knell for construction on the Peninsula," said high-speed board member Rod Diridon. "If it's a remedial action, we can deal with that."

The recent ruling may also delay Caltrain's long-range plans to expand commuter service by converting its diesel trains to electric. This would enable the agency to speed up service and run more trains more quickly. It is relying heavily on stimulus cash to bankroll the $785 million initiative, $516 million of which is still unfunded.

Some will surely quibble, as they have in recent comments, that this shows the flaws of Diridon's insistence on including the Peninsula corridor in the CHSRA application for federal HSR stimulus funds. Personally I think the CHSRA was right to be aggressive in pursuing these funds. But this does make clear that more than the old Altamont vs. Pacheco dispute is at stake here. Federal stimulus funds are necessary to get construction underway on the Peninsula - construction that, as Mike Scanlon pointed out Wednesday night, is vital to Caltrain's survival.

As I have repeatedly predicted, the parties to this lawsuit have decided it is acceptable to risk the future of passenger rail in the Bay Area - including the HSR project and the very existence of Caltrain - to pick a fight over what is a comparatively small matter. True supporters of HSR would have accepted the Pacheco choice, worked to ensure it was built properly and with respect to the environment, rather than use that choice to try and blow up the whole project.

Still, it is good to see that CHSRA and UPRR are trying to be sensible about this and are talking to each other about the matter. These discussions can take quite a long time - UPRR has been dragging its feet on selling the Davenport-Pajaro line to Santa Cruz County for over 5 years now.

Tough negotiations with freight companies are nothing new. Twenty years ago, it took more than two years of talks before Caltrain agreed to buy the San Jose-to-San Francisco tracks from Southern Pacific for $242.3 million. Talks between the Valley Transportation Authority and Union Pacific dragged on for four years before the VTA agreed in 2002 to pay $80 million to run the BART-to-San Jose extension down the UP corridor between Fremont and San Jose.

"We've negotiated with them on several acquisitions, and they are very difficult negotiators," VTA General Manager Michael Burns said. "They are a private company out to protect their interests.

"But I will be very surprised if at the end they don't reach an agreement."

This is why I believe a federal role is absolutely necessary to ensure these negotiations conclude quickly and fairly to all sides. Current federal law gives UPRR all the negotiating power, enabling a freight railroad whose operations often seem stuck in the middle of the 20th century to hold up the development of a modern 21st century passenger railroad network.

President Barack Obama has made high speed rail a key part of his administration's vision for America's future. But so far he seems to have emphasized HSR funding over the other key policy aspects of implementing HSR. Now I'm not going to complain that Obama wants to change 60 years of federal transportation policy and finally direct some real funds to HSR. And yet that's not going to be enough to ensure HSR happens.

While I recognize that it is not Obama's style to force or pressure anyone into doing anything, both the White House and the Congress - particularly California's two powerful US Senators - need to be examining ways to modernize US railroad policy and legislation. In particular they need to redress the balance of power between the freight railroads, which are essentially private contractors for the federal government and who owe their very existence to the federal government, and the state and local passenger rail systems that the federal government wishes to promote and expand.

The best way to accomplish this would be to have Senator Feinstein or Senator Boxer help mediate these conversations, potentially alongside the Secretary of Transportation or even Vice-President "Amtrak Joe" Biden. They can encourage UPRR and CHSRA to quickly come to an agreement that satisfies both sides, while letting UPRR know that if they do not come to a quick agreement, then perhaps it would be time to change federal law to help provide entities like CHSRA a more level playing field - starting with eliminating the obsolete ban on states using eminent domain on federally-chartered railroads.

That would require a greater level of leadership from California's federal representatives than we have yet seen on HSR. But it is now time for them to step up and prevent a signature project from falling into a morass.

Friday, August 28, 2009

A Grand Bargain With UPRR?

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

by Rafael

the recent Initial Ruling on Atherton v. CHSRA underscored yet again that lines on a map are not at all the same thing as deeds to rights of way. The judge essentially signaled that the level of risk of eminent domain takings needs to be quantified at the program level, i.e. factor into the choice of preferred route. In this particular case, the biggest red flag related to the UPRR Coast Corridor ROW between Santa Clara and Gilroy, especially the section south of way point "Lick". It lies roughly 3 miles south of San Jose Diridon, close to the intersection of Almaden Expressway and hwy 87.

However, that isn't the only stretch of the planned network in which CHSRA will have to contend with UPRR - far from it, in fact. As we discussed on this blog back in March, 50% of the entire HSR network as planned today relies on acquiring part of a UPRR right of way or else land very close to it. Where possible, the expensive grade separations required for HSR should include adjacent legacy tracks to maximize bang per taxpayer buck.


View UPRR sections of CA HSR route in a larger map

In the discussion thread on the Initial Ruling On Atherton v. CHSRA, regular commenter Tony D. in San Jose(?) Gilroy claimed that "Freight service in this corridor and traffic on Monterey Hwy is nil." While that's no doubt an overstatement, it does highlight the fact that the coast corridor isn't actually all that busy north of San Luis Obispo. Its primary value is as as a backup freight route in case UPRR's core route via Cajon Pass and the Tehachapis were to become unavailable for trains heading up the west coast or across to Salt Lake City, e.g. after an earthquake. Since UPRR is a for-profit enterprise, Tony surmised "that [it] will either operate or co-operate [with] high-speed rail in California. They're not blind to the profits HSR systems are making overseas [...]. I don't think this would be a bad arrangement."

To which another regular, SF native and Amtrak employee Jim, replied: "Well they can't just operate it, they have to bid on it first and prove that they can provide the service infrastructure (staff, ticketing systems, the list goes on per the requirements an operator must offer) and UP doesn't have any such thing or people to do the job. [CHSRA] wants someone who can bring experience, personnel and the other infrastructure needed for passenger travel. That means Amtrak, an airline or a foreign railway."

Now, I don't work for UPRR nor do I have any shares in the company or any other affiliation to it. I have no inside knowledge regarding where the company's head is really at relative to California HSR right now. Publicly, the company still maintains that HSR trains running next to its own would be a safety hazard. Simple passing of an aerodynamically contoured high speed train has already been shown not to present a showstopper problem even for extra-tall AAR plate H cars loaded with two empty containers. Lateral sway at the top of the upper container reached a maximum at a relative speed of 110mph and declined beyond that. The amount of sway obviously depends on the track centerline distance as well, which in the California system could be larger than the usual 15' or so (if the ROW is wide enough).

The root cause of the cited safety concerns may therefore be the quality of UPRR's track and rolling stock maintenance program. The income generated by hosting HSR would go a long way toward addressing any deficiencies on that score. Derailment detection and automatic train protection systems would further reduce the risk of a freight train ever fouling an adjacent track and also triggering a follow-on collision.

So, the noises UPRR is making could be either a signal that UPRR isn't really interested in avoiding derailments or, a negotiating ploy to jack up the price.



However, for the sake of argument, let's pretend that Tony is correct and that UPRR secretly would be interested in getting back into the intercity passenger rail business, if only it were sufficiently profitable.

The experience in other countries has shown that true bullet trains can and do turn operating profits, i.e. enough to pay for running the trains, maintaining the system, insurance fees and future expansion beyond the starter line. What they cannot do is turn a total profit, i.e. service the debt on the initial capital investment as well. That difference, combined with property tax laws, is why US railroads are not voluntarily building HSR systems on their own nickel. DesertXPress is the exception that proves the rule: it would be a loss leader for getting punters/tourists/convention attendees from (Southern) California to Lost Wages and back again.

HSR opponents often cite this inability of passenger rail to fully fund its own infrastructure as evidence that it is a bad idea per se. As this blog has often pointed out, they conveniently forget the financial, energy security, environmental and social costs shouldered by taxpayers when they agree to invest in new highway lane-miles and airport runways. Fortunately, California voters showed in November 2008 they understand that moving people - as opposed to freight - just isn't a profitable enterprise in its own right. It takes public investment to reap the macroeconomic benefits of high speed rail, which in the California system will include traveling on renewable electricity instead of distilled dino-juice.

Funding is supposed to come from federal, state and local governments plus private investors. The ~$33 billion estimate for the starter line reflects the cost of planning, land purchases, engineering, constructing the line plus yards and maintenance facilities, buying a fleet of trains and developing the human resources needed for safe and cost-effective operations. In its 2008 Business Plan (PDF p23), CHSRA estimated the cost of acquiring the ROW for the starter line at 7% of the the total, i.e. roughly $2.3 billion. This assumed that required land already in public hands (Caltrain, SCRRA, Caltrans etc.) would be made available at no cost.

However, since UPRR is an interstate freight railroad that ostensibly delivers a public service so valuable Congress even delegated limited powers of eminent domain to it, the chances of successfully exercising eminent domain against UPRR itself are slim to none. That means the company has CHSRA over a barrel and can more or less name its price. The initial ruling in Atherton v. CHSRA has now strengthened its hand even further.

The operations of the California HSR are supposed to be put out to tender via long-term contracts, separately for the infrastructure (a local monopoly) and the trains (competition possible). The idea was that these tenders will be entirely divorced from the process of acquiring land and getting the infrastructure built. However, there's more than one way to skin a cat. As we explored in the post on HiSpeed Services And Branding, there is always the option of bartering for ROW rather than paying for it up front.

Any railroad that owns a ROW that CHSRA would like a slice of could negotiate for the initial contract to operate the HSR infrastructure and/or for easements such as deeply discounted slots on the timetable or blocks of seats on trains to be operated by someone else. One-off asset sales generate cash, but railroad operators are in the business of running trains. Participating in the operations of the HSR system could therefore be an attractive proposition for them.

If CHSRA could somehow strike a statewide "Grand Bargain" barter deal with UPRR, that would solve most of its ROW issues at a stroke. It would also allow the Authority to claim UPRR as a private investor-in-kind. After all, a dollar you don't need to spend is almost as good as one you raise from financial institutions. Some lateral thinking could go a long way here.

Whether this would be a genuine bargain for taxpayers or a Faustian one obviously depends on the fine print, of which there would no doubt be copious amounts. Giving up on the opportunity to put the initial operations contracts out to open tender, reducing its scope and/or saddling it with easements would be no small matter. Negotiators would also need to put a dollar figure on the value of grade separations plus fences plus CCTV surveillance of the entire ROW width, including all legacy freight/passenger tracks, to a freight operator. Cameras and software could conceivably even detect a derailed bogie on a freight car before that train's crew does. The wireless signaling and train control infrastructure of the HSR network could be leveraged to implement interoperable PTC functionality on the heavy freight tracks at sharply lower incremental cost. If all traffic on the entire ROW is controlled by a single infrastructure operator, the accident liability issue should become much more tractable.

Add to that the potential for light rail freight, i.e. driverless High Speed Cargo trainsets coupled to passenger trains during the day plus a limited number of much slower cargosprinter or intermodal trains at night. Such trains would need to negotiate the 3.5% gradients in mountain crossings. To avoid excessive track maintenance overheads, the axle load on HSR tracks is strictly limited, typically to 17 metric tonnes, including the power cars/locomotives. That's only possible with non-compliant equipment, so light freight trains would be restricted to the isolated HSR network augmented with spurs to transshipment facilities in selected locations. The business model would be focused on getting high value goods shipped quickly and trucks off the roads. In technical, regulatory and business model respects, light freight would be entirely divorced from conventional heavy freight rail.

In the simplest scenario, UPRR could limit its involvement with HSR to operating and maintaining the infrastructure according to timetables negotiated with the train operator(s).

However, the company could go one step further and negotiate to also operate some or even all of the trains wholesale, by which I mean it would employ the drivers and maintain the rolling stock. Dealing with HSR and light freight equipment would involve a learning curve, but there would be plenty of time to build up a new business unit with a skilled workforce, headed up by managers poached from foreign railways that already have plenty of HSR experience. Keep in mind that UPRR has been in business for 147 years and that during most of that time, its progenitors did operate passenger trains. Companies can and do change their business models all the time, just look at how Apple Computer now makes cell phones and sells music online.

The retail end of high speed passenger trains, i.e. marketing, selling tickets, cabin service and cleaning, could be left to organizations that already have relevant expertise in the state: heavy rail transit operators (Amtrak California, Caltrain, Metrolink et al.), perhaps airlines already plying the California Corridor. Some of these might prefer to own their trainsets, others could charter them from UPRR in whatever livery they want. Similarly, UPRR might be content with just running the trains for established logistics players like FedEx, UPS etc. and not handle individual cargo items. On the other hand, retailing intermodal freight and cargosprinter service might well be something UPRR would want to do itself.

Final notes:

1) Needless to say, the bigger the bite of the HSR cherry UPRR would get without having to bid for it in open tender, the more value that would represent. At some point, it would exceed the total represented by the ROW offered. Conceivably, UPRR might even have to throw in track construction services, even cash, to get the deal it wants. That's fine, every dollar of private investment, in kind or regular, would let CHSRA stretch taxpayer dollars (both state and federal) that much further.

2) As part of any Grand Bargain, UPRR would formally transfer the ROW (land or underground/air rights) for the HSR tracks to a new entity owned by the state of California, possibly others as well. UPRR would not have a stake in this entity. This arrangement would let it avoid a massive hike on its property taxes while ensuring the new entity will be able to put the follow-on operations contracts out to a genuinely open tender some (large) number of years later.

3) Since infrastructure operations and maintenance and possibly train maintenance will be natural monopolies, the rates UPRR would be permitted to charge for these services would have to be spelled out in the Grand Bargain contract and regulated thereafter to prevent gouging. A cap on fee income would give UPRR an incentive to participate in track construction to make sure it's done right. The company does not yet have the specialized expertise required to actually design and build the track and overhead catenary geometry for a safe HSR system, that's where experienced foreign engineering consultants come in. UPRR would contribute its expertise in general track construction plus material logistics and some brawn plus supervisors on site. The idea is to let them learn on the job so they can maintain the high-tech infrastructure after it's built.

4) BNSF might be interested in a similar Grand Bargain in the Central Valley, perhaps even on its Trancon line out of the LA basin. HSR infrastructure operations are a natural local monopoly, with appropriate care it's perfectly possible to hand over control to another operator at well-defined interface locations. Air traffic controllers do it all time.

5) All of the above fun and game are moot if neither UPRR nor BNSF are interested in participating in HSR operations in any way. That is their prerogative, of course.

Monday, April 6, 2009

East Bay Blues

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

No, that's not Bob Dylan on the left, but it might as well be. Of all the major population centers in California, the eastern portion of the San Francisco Bay - Alameda and Contra Costa counties - arguably drew the shortest lot. True, East Bay residents will be closer to HSR stations on the starter line than anyone in San Diego or Sacramento, but there are currently no firm plans for an HSR station in either Oakland or Union City - ever.

Moreover, the new Transbay Terminal in San Francisco will be ~1/3 mile from the nearest BART station, Embarcadero, which gets overcrowded during rush hour. TJPA's plans for a pedestrian passage under Fremont Street are still "optional" at this point and, BART has made no commitment to use any of its $241 million share of the prop 1A bonds for additional side platforms at Embarcadero plus ramps featuring moving walkways connecting to such a passage. Unless that changes, BART passengers would have to hoof it across SF city streets to the HSR station, in any kind of weather, with baggage and perhaps children in tow. AC Transit will operate buses into the building, but its unclear how many HSR passengers will take advantage of that option.

Millbrae will hopefully offer a more convenient transfer, but BART takes it's sweet time getting out to there. Worse, on any given day of the week, only one line runs out to Millbrae, so many HSR passengers will have to transfer twice. Either way, the time lost just getting to and from the nearest HSR station will mean Oakland Airport will continue to offer flights to Southern California for many years to come.

HST/Commuter Overlay

Recently, CHSRA did award a $70 million contract to AECOM, for project-level EIR/EIS work on the awkwardly named "HST/commuter overlay" that is "under consideration" (see the pink bit here). The overlay concept was introduced toward the end of the whole Altamont vs. Pacheco debate as a punt ahead of the November election. The idea is to recycle the work done on the Altamont options studied for HSR into an ill-defined regional adjunct to the core HSR network. The overlay would link Stockton and Modesto to Oakland and San Jose via Tracy, Pleasanton and Union City. There is, however, no money at all for building this overlay in either phase I (starter line) or phase II (spurs to San Diego, Sacramento and Irvine).

Moreover, the originally selected route between Pleasanton and San Jose would have trains emerging from a curved tunnel in Niles and then proceeding south via the UPRR and WPML rights of way, CA-262 and the I-880 median. Now that Santa Clara county voters have voted to add another 1/8th of a percent to their sales tax to actually bring BART to San Jose, the short but vital WPML section is no longer available. Co-operation from UPRR was always an iffy proposition anyhow, especially in Fremont. Note that Parsons Brinkerhoff are the lead consultants on both HSR and the BART extension to SantaClara/SJC. That obvious conflict of interest alone ought to speak volumes about how major transit infrastructure projects are run in Northern California.

Realistically, nothing will come of the overlay concept anytime soon. And by soon, I mean before 2030. The only exception would be if CHSRA were unable to obtain a ROW out of San Jose and down to Gilroy, e.g. because of environmental justice issues or opposition from UPRR in principle. Some observers have characterized that railroad's stance as a negotiating ploy and that may yet turn out to be true: as a for-profit enterprise, money talks even for UPRR. On the other hand, it is a long-standing, profitable enterprise that just might walk away even from a juicy deal if it thinks it could be detrimental to its core business. Time will tell.

Existing East Bay Passenger Rail Services

Meanwhile, there are already several passenger rail services in the East Bay, in addition to BART. First, there's Amtrak Capitol Corridor, which is operated by Amtrak but managed by BART (h/t to anon @ 12:50pm). It connects San Jose to Oakland to Sacramento and Auburn. The core segment between Oakland Jack London Square is served by 16 trains each way on weekdays and 11 on weekends/holidays. San Jose is served by 7 trains.

Second, there are the four daily Amtrak San Joaquins (each way) between Oakland Jack London Square (OKJ) and Bakersfield. There are also two daily Amtrak long-distance trains serving the area: the Coast Starlight between Seattle and LA and the California Zephyr from Chicago to Emeryville, with a bus connection to San Francisco.

Third, there is the Altamont Commuter Express between Stockton and San Jose, also offering four trains each way but only on weekdays.

However, this isn't quite the transit smorgasbord it may seem to some: Amtrak Capitol Corridor only connects to BART at the OaklandColiseum/OAK and Richmond stations. San Joaquins connect only at Richmond and the other standard gauge services don't connect at all. With some track work, the San Joaquins could have an intermodal station with BART in North Concord now that the Navy has returned the inland portion of the old Naval Weapons Station to the city. However, planners there appear to see no value in an intermodal station and appear to have settled on a TOD concept served by BART alone. That means the questionable eBART project to extend service to Antioch - using new DMU equipment rather than regular BART rolling stock - remains alive and kicking.

Amtrak via new Nelson Mandela Station

In particular, the OKJ station is served by a grand total of just two AC Transit bus lines, with a few more stopping 1/4 mile further west. For a city of 400,000 that is also at the geographic heart of the BART system, OKJ isn't an effective Central Station for standard gauge rail. Unfortunately, running tracks right into downtown (near 12th/Broadway) would require many miles of expensive tunneling.

Fortunately, there may be a more affordable compromise: a shortcut between Emeryville and Jack London Square via Nelson Mandela Parkway. That is a city street, so the alignment would have to run in a mostly covered trench. It has also been lovingly landscaped, something that might have to be re-done at the end of construction. The prize, however, may well be worth it: an intermodal station with West Oakland BART, just one stop from downtown Oakland and downtown SF. In addition better connections into Oakland, the point of the exercise would be to reduce line haul time between SFO, downtown SF, Sacramento and Truckee (in Winter), thus relieving pressure on I-80.


View Larger Map

While not exactly a Central Station in the traditional sense, the West Oakland location could act as a regional transfer hub. The station is currently served by three AC Transit bus lines, more could conceivably be added. There are also plenty of empty lots in the area that could support parking or taxi service if there is demand.

The biggest obstacle to construction, other than funding, would be the UPRR yard next to I-880 and 3rd Street. Passenger trains are not permitted in freight rail yards, so the alignment would have to skirt the terrain while rising back up to grade level. A couple of industrial businesses, one of which looks like a cardboard recycling center, might be affected by eminent domain as a result. Note the single track connector hugging I-880: it would only be used by southbound trains that need to return to Emeryville. There is not enough room for a dual-track loop, nor is one needed. Note that a new "Nelson Mandela" station might prompt Amtrak to reduce service to Jack London Square.

Amtrak CC: WiFi on Board

Like Caltrain before it, Amtrak Capitol Corridor recently conducted a WiFi on Board trial based on terrestrial WiMAX connections to the fixed infrastructure. The service proved much more popular than Amtrak California had bargained for. Nevertheless, the plan is to upgrade bandwidth capacity and still offer it at no charge - something that would be easy enough to do: just print a one-time password good for 2 hours on the ticket. The rationale is evidently that courtesy internet access will help boost seat capacity utilization. Stay tuned.

ACE via Union City BART

Further south, there is scope for an intermodal station with BART in Union City. There is a little-used single-track freight spur running from Industrial Parkway to Niles via Van Euw Common, right alongside the elevated BART tracks. SMCTA had already identified this possibility in the context of plans for limited commuter service across the 100-year old Dumbarton rail bridge, but this has been postponed by the suspicious 1998 fire that destroyed the western trestle and, by the need to repay a $145 million loan from the BART extension to Fremont Warm Springs that San Mateo county had to take out to pay for cost overruns related to the extension to Millbrae/SFO. Some $54 million is still outstanding, the project time line keeps slipping.

However, one opportunity appears to have been overlooked in this context: with some additional track work and trackage rights, the existing ACE service could in theory make a detour via this anyhow planned intermodal station with BART in Union City, cut over to Union Landing (I-880/Whipple Rd) and back down to Newark, as shown in green on on the map below. In addition to the BART intermodal, there would be two new stations to improve transit options for the army of Silicon Valley worker bees that sleeps in the East Bay. Like the Amtrak Capitol Corridor trains, this modified ACE route would still include a stop at Great America in the heart of the "Golden Triangle" bordered by CA-237, I-880 and US-101. BART does not and will not reach that destination.


View Larger Map

ACE to SF via Niles Canyon north slope

Shown in red on the map is the option of a new ACE service direct to additional Silicon Valley employers, Millbrae/SFO and SF 4th & King. In addition to a little bit of access track work north of Sunol and in San Jose, this would involve trackage rights from UPRR or NCRY (whichever now owns the old SP ROW along the north slope of Niles Canyon) plus trackage rights from UPRR along the Milpitas line. At the wye in San Jose, trains would head north up to San Francisco via the Caltrain ROW, in baby bullet mode. That would require trackage rights from PCJPB plus permission from UPRR, which still owns the rights to intercity passenger service on the SF peninsula. One option would be for ACE to accept Caltrain tickets on the peninsula and deduct their value from the trackage fees.

The Milpitas Line is little-used south of 101 but represents a valuable back-up route in case the Alviso line through the salt marshes ever becomes unavailable, e.g. because of an earthquake. However, any passenger rail service on this line south of 101 should implement FRA quiet zone regulations first. Of course, if and when the Dumbarton rail bridge re-opens, there could be scope for further improvements to ACE.

The bigger issues may be in Pleasanton, Livermore and especially, in Altamont Pass itself. Single tracking and slow freight trains mean ACE is at the mercy of UPRR as it tries to stick to its schedule, though it has earned high marks for punctuality recently. That said, the service does take 2h10m to cover 86 miles - not exactly a high speed train.

Sunday, April 5, 2009

Transbay Terminal Redux

NOTE: We've moved! Visit us at the California High Speed Rail Blog.

Heads Up: Neighborhood meeting on HSR for residents of the Willow Glen neighborhood in San Jose, on Wednesday, April 8 at 1292 Minnesota Ave from 7-9pm. Resources at the end of this post.




The fair city of San Francisco has probably had more than its fair share of coverage on this blog. In just the past couple of months, we've already had quite a few posts recently on the controversial new Transbay Terminal Center (see posts 1, 2, 3). In addition, Clem Tillier has published a post on the Focus On: SF Transbay Transit Center on his Caltrain-HSR Compatibility Blog.

So why revisit this issue yet again? Well, because Quentin Kopp is once again saying that 4th & King would be good enough for him - knowing full well that this will unleash howls of protest from SF city officials and residents, in no small measure because CHSRA consistently marketed the starter line as going from downtown San Francisco to San Jose Diridon, LA Union Station and Anaheim ARTIC.

Note, however, one flaw in the snippet from the Examiner: supporting a five-minute headway on the HSR line down the peninsula is not quite the same thing as actually running a train literally every five minutes. It just means that the signaling and other technology has to cope with an HSR train following another within the space of five minutes, something that may well happen at certain times in a timetable supporting multiple service classes (e.g. express, semi-express, semi-local, local). Recovery from unexpected delays and other off-design conditions may also require operators to minimize headways at certain times. Safe operations of sections of a line with moderate speed limits are possible with as little as 2.5-3 minute headways, so 5 is actually conservative.

The number of platforms is a potential issue a number of decades down the road, maybe. On the other hand, the poor design of the connection between the DTX tunnel and the platforms, the so-called "throat", is a real issue right now because Caltrain will also use the tunnel and downtown station. It's a bottleneck even an expensive three-track tunnel cannot fully resolve. Moreover, according to Clem, the current design of the DTX tunnel features curve radii so small that they effectively preclude the use of Japanese shinkansen train designs for the California system.

Recap

The current design features 6 long platform tracks, some slightly curved, accessed via three-track tunnel out to Caltrain's existing 4th & King terminus station. The six tracks would be accessible via three island platforms, one for Caltrain and the other two for HSR. The split is partly a result of Caltrain's decision to stick with low platforms even at the Transbay Terminal, where no freight train will ever go.

The reason for the ongoing brouhaha over this one station is really quite simple. CHSRA has raised a very late red flag on the design of the DTX tunnel and train box, claiming it does not support the 12 HSR trains per hour (tph) each way that he thinks it should support, in addition to the 10tph Caltrain is hoping to run during weekday rush hour in 2025. I've argued that (a) any sane operator would anyhow choose to terminate some HSR trains further south long before reaching 12tph and, (b) that four platform tracks is anyhow enough for 12tph if you enforce some pedestrian flow control.

Tellingly, the red flag came - or rather, was shown in public - only after the Transbay Joint Powers Authority (TJPA) decided to apply directly for a slice of the HSR funds in the stimulus bill, rather than route that request through CHSRA. TJPA had previously been under the impression that 4tph would be sufficient for HSR operations. While that's true for the early years, perhaps even for several decades, CHSRA thinks its job is to deliver an infrastructure with enough capacity for the next 50, even 100 years. There is some method to that madness, as expanding a constrained downtown station decades after initial construction is usually extremely difficult/expensive or downright impossible.

While the timing suggested a political motivation, there does appear to be a real problem after all: the so-called throat, in which the six platform tracks have to converge to the smaller number in the tunnel, is very tight and by all accounts poorly designed. It constrains throughput for no good reason, Clem included a much improved version designed by Richard Mlynarik in his post.

Still, with a minimum curve radius of just 150m (~500ft), even Richard's improved version would effectively preclude the purchase of proven, off-the-shelf Japanese high speed trains - those need at least 280m, preferably more. SF real estate development should not drive HSR vendor decisions with statewide implications. To my mind, this is a red flag well worth raising - though CHSRA could and should have done so much sooner and publicly if TJPA was dismissive of this particular issue.

Station Requirements

Like any building, the aesthetics of the Transbay Terminal have their fans and their detractors. You can't argue about taste. What matters more to transportation engineers is functionality, which the current design might meet, sort of, for both CHSRA and Caltrain, but only after some modifications.

I've thought about this some more since my last post on it and have come to the following conclusion: the train portion of the design is suboptimal because planners interpreted the intent of SF voters (prop H, 1999) very narrowly as bringing the trains into the building itself. However, nobody except the developers really cares about that. IMHO, the voter intent was that the trains should stop within walking distance of the financial center, preferably also close to the bus terminal and such that an option of a second transbay tube to downtown Oakland is created.

If you subscribe to this more liberal interpretation, it is no longer essential to run tracks into the basement of the Transbay Terminal building. Rather, the focus can shift to a design that better meets the requirements of modern railway operations:
  • large platform number (more than six)
  • no platforms dedicated to any one operator
  • all platforms full length (400m, i.e. 1/4 mile)
  • all platforms straight
  • all platforms level boarding (see Caveats below)
  • high pedestrian flow capacity between trains and city streets
  • minimum curve radius 280m (vendor flexibility, screeching noise)
  • minimal cross-blocking of trains entering and exiting the terminus station
  • all platform tracks run-through if second transbay tube is ever constructed
Train Station Under Mission Street

Fortunately, it's actually possible to meet these requirements in San Francisco, though it requires divorcing the design of the Transbay Terminal building from that of the railway station. The two would be linked via city streets, possibly a short underground pedestrian passage. If that's good enough for linking to BART and SF Muni subway, why the absolute requirement to put standard gauge trains into the basement? The upshot is that the Transbay Terminal should go ahead as planned, but without a train box or concourse level.

The following map and topology diagram show the concept I've come up with: a Central Station for San Francisco underneath Mission Street. Detailed design and construction would be far from trivial: many SF city buses use Mission to reach downtown, so tearing open that street would be quite disruptive during construction, even if it is done one block at a time. In addition, the street is quite narrow, around 85 feet including both sidewalks. That's only enough room for three tracks, two side platforms and narrow escalators/flights of stairs - which implies a lot of those would be needed to secure sufficient pedestrian flow capacity. Finally, there is almost certainly plenty of plumbing, ancient sewer mains, power mains etc. lurking underneath street level.


View Larger Map



Tunnel Route

The first thing you'll notice is that the DTX tunnel runs down 7th and Mission Streets, a very different route from the one currently proposed. I'm advocating just two tunnel tracks side-by-side, shared by non-compliant HSR and equally non-compliant Caltrain EMU trains, protected by appropriate signaling. Any legacy FRA-compliant trains need to terminate at 4th & King anyhow, since they're diesel-powered. Nevertheless, track sharing is only possible if FRA approves both Caltrain's request to switch to non-compliant EMUs and CHSRA's intent to buy proven, off-the-shelf but non-compliant bullet trains capable of cruising at 220mph.

One fringe benefit of the changed tunnel route is that no platform tracks are lost at 4th & King. Only a single 90 degree turn is required, in an area where real estate is probably less expensive than in Rincon Hill or downtown. In combination with the less complex excavation methods required for two single-track curved tunnels, this ought to permit a sufficiently generous curve radius. The map shows the maximum feasible radius of ~325m, there are various length constraints along Mission Street. A more detailed design would seek to optimize the radius as tunneling under existing buildings is expensive. Note that I have assumed the curve would be level; a helical curve would permit gradients of less than 3.5% in the vertical elevation change sections at either end.

My point is that the radius can be made large enough even for off-the-shelf Japanese high speed trains. This also eliminates any screeching noises from the long-wheelbase trucks required for stability at high speed. Crucially, it also increases station throat throughput because speed limits are proportional to the square root of curve radius. With appropriate tracks superelevation, it should be possible for outbound trains (non-tilt types) to take this corner at speeds as high as 60 mph, assuming the curve radii and speed limits for the various points along the way also have appropriate values.

The design objective should be to permit a train to pull away from any platform at maximum acceleration (~1.1 m/s^2 for Caltrain locals) and maintain that until it either hits the speed limit or has cleared the station's outer throat, i.e. the point at which tracks from the two levels converge. The minimum available distance for acceleration is about 1/2 mile, though trains on the lower platform face a 3.5% uphill climb for half that distance. Either way, any given Caltrain leaving an east platform should be able to clear the inner throat near 3rd Street within 75 seconds and the outer throat within 120. Maximum acceleration for HSR trains is more like 0.6-0.8 m/s^2 so they may take a little bit longer. Note that an incoming train may proceed past the outer throat as far as the inner one while a train is emerging from the same level; this provides a 15 second buffer.

Conclusion: as long as the curve in the access tunnel can be taken at fairly high speed, the elongated nature of the station layout does not appear to present a throughput bottleneck since the maximum time required to clear the outer throat is still less than the absolute minimum time separation imposed by the two-track access tunnel, i.e. 150 seconds at 24tph for HSR and Caltrain combined. Platform dwell times of at least 16 minutes are possible even at this insanely high level of traffic, which SF will almost certainly not attract in the next 50 years - if ever.

The downside is that the Mission Creek outfall needs to be crossed at grade, so a short section of 7th Street would lose two traffic lanes. More significantly, Townsend Street would be permanently severed at 7th unless an overpass were constructed.

Throat And Platform Layout

The second thing you'll notice is that the approach to the station is both long and straight, ideal conditions for designing a throat for minimal interference. In this case, the inbound and outbound tracks need to split into two levels that I call -2 and -3 for reasons that will be come obvious shortly. This split begins immediately east of the curved section. By the time the tracks reach Jessie St West, they need to be stacked 2x2 on top of each other. This ensures that any inbound trains waiting to reach a platform can wait west of 3rd Street on the correct level, without blocking inbound trains on the other level.

Near 3rd Street, the two tracks on each level first combine into a single track and then immediately split via a three-way point into a through track and sidings left and right of it. These sidings are the west platform tracks (2-1, 2-2 & 3-1, 3-2), each with its side platform. A second three-way point near Shaw Alley reconnects these sidings to the through track. East of this point, the through track may descend for a block to compensate for changes in the surface level (at-grade does not mean constant elevation above MSL). Regardless of length, trains always stop on the west platforms such that one end is at Shaw Alley.

A third three-way point at 1st Street provides access to two additional platform tracks east of that location (2-3, 2-4 & 3-3, 3-4). Regardless of length, trains always stop on the east platforms such that one end is at 1st Street. Space should be reserved for a future fourth three-way point reconnecting the east sidings to the through track, for reasons that will become obvious shortly.

Since there is no room for an access platform, the through track between these east sidings can only be used for train storage. Perhaps it could also be used as a tail track for the western platforms if cleaning/provisioning staff board and alight there. However, the only emergency escape route would be at Spear Street, which implies walking the length of the train first.

The layout described above means trains don't block each others' movements any more than necessary. The longest wait states would occur for an inbound train waiting for another to clear one of the east platforms, since that needs to travel up to half a mile first. At an average speed of 20mph along the center track, that would take 90 seconds. The worst-case wait state for a western platform would about a minute. In practice, well-planned operations would minimize wait states or eliminate them altogether by slowing inbound trains down rather than forcing them to come to a full stop. Worst case, there is room for one full-length train between Jessie Street West and 3rd Street.

Operationally, any given train would always stop such that one end ends up at 1st Street, within half a block of the Transbay Terminal building. In addition to supporting regional buses, the building would also contain the customer service counters for train operators, baggage depot, police station, shops, cafes, lounges/waiting areas, bicycle parking etc. Taxi and city bus stops are located on the plaza between Minna and Mission, Fremont and 1st. In other words, the concept of a multimodal hub is preserved even though the tracks are not underneath the building.

The train station would be really a bare bones affair: just the trains and access infrastructure plus some ticket vending machines and restrooms at intersections with cross streets. Mission Street isn't wide enough to accommodate any other facilities on the platform levels.

Concourse Level

Strictly speaking, there is no need for a formal concourse level at -1. Since the design uses side platforms throughput, surface streets could be used to access all of them. However, given the anticipated number of passengers, it is safer to provide pedestrian underpasses across Mission Street, even though that means digging a deeper (i.e. more expensive) trench than would otherwise be necessary. Moreover, the desire to provide four full length platforms per level means long walks are inevitable for some passengers on full-length trains. The concourse level would therefore feature moving walkways in both directions along its entire length, interrupted at the eight locations at which there are exits to the surface on both sides of Mission Street.

To either side of these central moving walkways would be regular ones, about 10 feet wide each. To either side of those would be the baggage screening areas, if Homeland Security requires any. Airport-style check-in is possible but usually (a) conductor(s) on board the train will inspect passengers' tickets. Note that security procedures are pointless unless they are implemented at all HSR stations. In any case, terrorists haven't attacked a long-distance train in Europe since Carlos the Jackal did in 1983. Instead, they've targeted subways and commuter trains as well as high speed tracks. Train stations are also at risk.

Optionally, staff could prevent passengers waiting to board from descending until they get a signal from colleagues below that all arriving passengers have cleared the platform. Unless the fire marshal requires this at all times, it would normally only be done during peak periods to avoid excessive congestion on the platforms. Note that the platforms on the two train levels would feature multiple stairs/escalators to the concourse level. Escalators intended for the disabled, women with baby strollers etc. would connect all three levels. Connections directly to the surface are ok only if Homeland Security decides it doesn't need to enforce access control to the platforms.

Pedestrian Cross Passages

A pedestrian passage underneath 1St Street between the train station and the Transbay Terminal building would not be absolutely essential but nevertheless very useful, given the vehicle traffic on the surface. Such a passage is currently planned as an optional extra between the building and Market Street, but under Fremont Street. Note that in the station design discussed in this post, the building would not need a concourse level for transportation purposes, just stairs/escalators/elevators to the pedestrian passage, if any. Moving walkways along this 200 foot stretch would be convenient for passengers and increase throughput capacity.

Additional pedestrian passages under Main and 2nd Street could connect the train station and indirectly, the Transbay Terminal building to both Embarcadero and Montgomery Street BART/SF Muni. Again, not strictly necessary but useful.

Note that all these underground pedestrian passages would provide shelter against the elements. Unfortunately, they may also attract pickpockets, buskers, alcoholics, drug addicts, graffiti artists, homeless people and others just hanging out for no apparent reason. Bright lighting, ventilation, cleaning and security patrols are needed to ensure passengers will feel safe and comfortable enough to use these facilities. It may make sense to ensure the passages are private rather than public property so security has a legal basis (trespassing) for evicting disruptive individuals.

Phasing And Extension to East Bay

What I've described above is actually the fully built out terminus station. If desired, construction could be divided into two phases to accommodate budget constraints. Phase One would be the access tunnel via 7th an Mission plus the four west platforms, possibly the pedestrian cross passages to the the Transbay Terminal building and Montgomery Street BART as well. Phase Two would be the east platforms beyond 1St Street plus the pedestrian passage to Embarcadero BART. The west platforms could already be in operation at that point.

If and when a decision is made to build a second transbay tube, the Mission Street station design affords a fairly straightforward if expensive connection via Point Alameda and into downtown Oakland up Franklin. On the SF side, the tracks should already be deep enough to avoid conflicts with the descending SF Muni subway tracks under the Embarcadero. There is enough room for the through track at level -2 to descend to level -3 between Spear Street and the water's edge. However, unlike the west throat, there is no need to double-track this new one on the east end: instead, the four platforms on the upper level would be used for inbound and the ones on the lower level for outbound trains (or vice versa). This operations change turns all eight platform tracks into run-through types, thanks to the four three-way points installed on each level.

In addition, the presence of a through track in each direction would permit trains to bypass all of the platform tracks. That could be useful for e.g. high speed cargo trains if a transshipment terminal were built in the East Bay or, for trains supporting a major sports or other event on Point Alameda or in Oakland. Normally, however, trains would dwell for a considerable amount of time in SF. Even at 24tph for HSR and Caltrain locals combined, having four platforms each way available means dwell times of close to 20 minutes would be feasible.

Caveats

I've already touched on a number of caveats, such as the consequences for 7th and Townsend Streets and, the need to pass under SF Muni tracks at the Embarcadero. In addition to those, there is a potential conflict with the planned SF Muni Central Subway. That is supposed to dive under the BART tracks at level -3 and, it looks like the chosen alignment (alternative 3B, Fig 2.12 would be deep enough at Mission Street to avoid a conflict with the alternate heavy rail access tunnel described above. However, if heavy rail station under Mission Street is considered, the clearance issue at 4th Street ought to be double-checked before ground is broken on the Central Subway. I don't have a good sense of how the surface grade changes between 4th and Embarcadero along Mission Street. The heavy rail tunnels should be level from 3rd to Shaw Alley and from 1st to Spear Street yet still deep enough to permit a concourse level plus a future extension to Oakland.

Another caveat is that passengers need to know not just the platform but also the car number of their train to descend at the appropriate point. The preferred approach is mandatory seat reservations (cp. TGV in France), the receipt can then include this information. Given the width constraints, pedestrian traffic along the platforms should be minimized. Reservations also ensure there are no standees on the train and that no-one needs to walk far inside the train to reach their seat.

Also on the receipt could be helpful hints, e.g. the nearest BART/SF Muni subway/SF Muni streetcar. Indeed, a good reservation system would ask about your connecting transportation to offer you a seat that minimizes your transfer distance. That could be printed on the receipt, along with an indication of how many minutes to budget for an comfortable transfer incl. security screening, if any. The flip side of seat reservations is that a late change to the platform, especially from one west of 1st Street to one east of it (or vice versa), would cause significant inconvenience for passengers.

Finally, I've assumed throughout that all eight platforms in the design would be created equal, i.e. that all would feature level boarding at the international standard of 3'6" (1067mm). Caltrain is hamstrung by a ridiculous 1948 rule intended to protect freight railroad workers hanging off the sides of cars. Is it really appropriate to perpetuate ye olde tyme practices to the detriment of passenger convenience and throughput capacity, in a station that no freight train will ever enter? IMHO, if Caltrain wants access to any downtown station in SF, it needs to buy EMU equipment that can cope with both level boarding and the lower level (2'1" = 639mm) that the platforms at its other stations are built to. If UPRR and CPUC have no objection, those could be upgraded to level boarding as well over time.



Heads Up: Neighborhood meeting on HSR for residents of the Willow Glen neighborhood in San Jose, on Wednesday, April 8 at 1292 Minnesota Ave from 7-9pm.

The purpose of the project-level EIR/EIS phase is to nail down how the HSR alignment should be constructed in each location, after close consultation with the affected communities. The starting point will be what CHSRA consultants suggested for the purposes of cost estimation prior to the election. This information has been available online since 2007, though you do have to look for it. The Authority is a planning body, i.e. a bureaucratic organization - most of its documents were designed for hardcopy rather than the web.

The objective of the HSR project is to deliver a net gain for the state California, especially for the cities served by stations. The following resources may help you understand what CHSRA has done to date regarding San Jose and the Willow Glen area in particular.

Resources:
If you plan to attend this meeting, you may want to download selected resource documents at home and bring them along on a laptop.